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Abstract: For over two decades, development practitioners, scholars, and 
institutions have celebrated microfinance—broadly defined as the provision of small-
scale financial services to the world’s poor—as an effective tool for poverty alleviation 
and local economic development. Critics of microfinance, however, suggest that there is 
little clear evidence to support the claims that microfinance lifts the poor out of poverty 
and fosters local economic development. In this thesis, I explore some of the challenges 
to microfinance in northern Nicaragua by exploring a case study of a group of borrowers 
who have confronted microfinance and exposed some serious problems. Since 2008, 
thousands of microcredit clients in Nicaragua have expressed their extreme frustration 
with microfinance and its detrimental effects in their lives. In this case, Nicaraguans 
caught up in the microfinance scheme risk losing their homes and livelihoods and falling 
into greater poverty. These borrowers, organized as El Movimiento de Pequeños 
Productores, Comerciantes y Microempresarios del Norte (the Movement of Producers, 
Merchants and Small Business Owners of the North), demand new terms on their 
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microcredit debts and new client protections. I explore the reaction and the demands of 
these borrowers and their direct and indirect critiques of the microcredit sector, its 
practices and its alleged goals. I argue that the resistance of the MPCN reveals the 
political and economic rationale and neoliberal ideology behind microcredit as a poverty 
alleviation intervention, and their contestation challenges its underlying logic. These 
critiques and demands provide us with a foundation for rethinking the prevailing market-
oriented approaches to development.  
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For over two decades, development practitioners, scholars, and institutions have 
celebrated microfinance—broadly defined as the provision of small-scale financial 
services to the world’s poor—as an effective tool for poverty alleviation and local 
economic development. Microfinance advocates have envisioned and marketed modern 
microfinance as a worldwide “movement” to help the poor lift themselves up by the 
bootstraps and out of poverty (Daley-Harris 2002; Yunus 2007 and 2010; Smith and 
Thompson 2007; Bornstein 1997; McLeod Arnopoulos 2010). With its current emphasis 
on creating sustainable lending programs, microfinance has been credited as a “win-win” 
approach to development: the poor have access to financial resources to improve their 
standard of living through the market, and development partners make a profitable return 
on investment (Kalpana 2005). Claims of the potential to generate household income, 
promote employment and productive activities, stimulate local bottoms-up development, 
and empower the poor through sustainable and profitable microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) have elevated microfinance to one of the primary interventions in international 
development policy (Rankin 2001; Bateman 2010).  
In 2009, the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) reported on 1,935 MFIs 
worldwide that served 92.2 million client borrowers and held US$65 billion in gross loan 
portfolios (MIX 2010). The World Bank, the United Nations, USAID, regional 
development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), bi- and 
multi-lateral development agencies, a number of third world state governments, and even 
some first world commercial banks have rallied behind microfinance. Large foundations, 
such as the Ford Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have lent 
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financial and technical support to microfinance efforts around the world. Wealthy 
philanthropists such as George Soros and eBay founder Pierre Omidyar have pledged 
millions of dollars to support microcredit, and high-profile political figures and 
Hollywood stars have drawn in the public’s fascination with the model. With the 
development of internet-based peer-to-peer platforms like Kiva.org, individuals can get 
involved and lend even a few dollars to a microentrepreneur in a developing country. In 
the past decade, the appeal of microfinance and its promises have solidified its 
fashionable role in the developed/donor world.  
Critics of microfinance, however, suggest that there is little clear evidence to 
support the claims that microfinance lifts the poor out of poverty and fosters local 
economic development (Bateman 2007 and 2010; Ellerman 2007; Dichter 2006; Karmini 
2007; Rosenberg 2010; see other critiques in Dichter and Harper 2007). Rather, critics 
caution that microfinance has the serious potential to harm its clients with some 
borrowers falling into greater poverty and facing other negative outcomes. A few critics 
also question microfinance’s role in the path to economic development and have 
suggested that microfinance may in fact interfere with the very possibilities for real long-
term economic growth (Bateman 2010). In this thesis, I explore some of the challenges to 
microfinance in northern Nicaragua through a case study of a group of borrowers who 
have confronted microfinance and exposed some serious problems.  
Since 2008, thousands of microcredit clients in northern Nicaragua have 
expressed their extreme frustration with microfinance and its detrimental effects in their 
lives. In the case I present in this thesis, poor and non-poor Nicaraguans caught up in the 
microfinance scheme risk losing their homes and livelihoods and falling into greater 
poverty. For three years, borrowers, organized as El Movimiento de Pequeños 
Productores, Comerciantes y Microempresarios del Norte (the Movement of Producers, 
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Merchants and Small Business Owners of the North), MPCN, have marched through the 
streets of their communities and the capital, formed disruptive road blockades, and 
planted themselves in front of MFI branches and government buildings to demand new 
terms on their microcredit debts and new client protections.  
The political force of the protests has destabilized Nicaragua’s microcredit sector: 
default rates have risen, resources and lending have tightened, and microfinance 
institutions have closed (Alemán, Álvarez, and Vanegas 2008; Galeano and Aleman 
2009; Martînez 2009; Álvarez Hidalgo 2009; Núñez 2009; Núñez, Marenco, and 
Potosme 2010). The tensions have spurred new discussions about the role and structure of 
private microcredit and the state in the national financial markets. In response to the 
protests, microcredit leaders and international donors and investors have attacked the 
MPCN and vocally defended their standard practices and their significant role in 
providing credit resources to Nicaragua’s underserved (Nuñez 2010a; Álvarez Hidalgo 
and Nuñez 2009; Núñez Roodman 2009). The Nicaraguan government, through various 
different actors and at different times, has taken complicated and often contradictory 
positions in relation to the MPCN, the microfinance sector, and its own role in the 
provision of credit to the poor. 
The goal of this thesis is to explore the reaction and the demands of these 
borrowers and their direct and indirect critiques of the microcredit sector, its practices 
and its alleged goals. I argue that the resistance of the MPCN reveals the political and 
economic rationale and neoliberal ideology behind microcredit as a poverty alleviation 
intervention, and their contestation challenges its underlying logic. These critiques and 
demands provide us with a foundation for rethinking the prevailing market-oriented 
approaches to development. Ultimately, I suggest that the predominant model of 
microfinance serves as an integral part of the hegemonic neoliberal economic project.  
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As anthropologist Aminur Rahman argues, “There is a growing fascination with 
the mechanics of microfinance, with the vehicle. There is less and less concern about the 
passengers and their destination” (quoted in Lont and Hospes 2004:3). By sharing some 
of these borrowers’ stories—which are sorely lacking in the present discourse on 
microfinance—I hope to uncover something more about these passengers and their 
understanding of microfinance and its repercussions in their lives, and to deepen the 
discussion of microfinance and its consequences for the world’s poor. This thesis is my 
interpretation of the reaction of a group of people against the microfinance sector in 
Nicaragua and, more generally, against the economic abandonment in which they live.  I 
locate theoretical and practical critiques of microfinance, specifically related to its 
complex relation to the economic exclusion symptomatic of the greater neoliberal 
capitalist structure and the limitations of its vision for poverty alleviation. 
Part of this story reflects the specifics of the way in which microfinance has 
developed and functions within its context in Nicaragua. Despite the contextual 
particularities, I suggest that the resistance to microfinance in Nicaragua speaks to 
growing contestation—from borrowers, lenders, professionals, and academics—that is 
beginning to shake the base of the microfinance bandwagon. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In July 2008, I stood in line to exchange currency in a branch of Banco ProCrédit, 
a microfinance institution in a semi-rural town in northern Nicaragua. Within a matter of 
minutes, some 50 or 60 protestors barricaded the front of the building and blocked the 
employees and clients, including me, from exiting. People waiting in the lines turned to 
see the demonstration and mumbled under their breath, but quickly quieted. Days later, 
 5 
another demonstration ended in police confrontation and violence and, in response to the 
tense situation, microfinance institutions in the area shut their doors and ceased 
operations for several days. When I returned to the United States shortly thereafter, 
headlines in the national press recounted the continued demonstrations against local 
microfinance institutions. Curious to understand the nature of the protests, I spent the 
following year tracking news coverage of the MPCN’s demonstrations and their legal 
demands. 
As I followed the protests from a distance, I began to develop a critical 
understanding of the protest against microfinance and what I saw as a larger struggle 
against the neoliberal capitalist system. I entered the field again one year later armed with 
my budding analysis and excited to exchange these ideas with the borrowers in the 
movement. But instead I was met with a general lack of a similar vision or analysis, and 
my ideas of resistance were challenged. Not only had I assumed that in the situation of 
domination and inequality, there would be resistance, but that this resistance would take 
particular forms, would hold particular ideologies, and would more certainly imagine the 
overthrow of oppressive systems and forms of domination. My disorientation in the field 
raised a number of interesting questions about resistance. How do we understand local 
instances of resistance when they are not tied to ideologies of liberation or the overthrow 
of larger systems of domination? What do these forms of resistances reveal about the 
complexity of the relationship of resistance to power? What are the methodological and 
analytical implications? How can I balance my political alignment to the movement I 
study with my commitment to scholarship and analytical advancement? 
Informed by the major theoretical contributions to the theories of power, 
resistance, and revolution put forth by Marx and Gramsci, scholars of the 1960s and 
1970s produced studies of resistance of large-scale peasant rebellion and revolution. 
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Shifting directions, later scholars turned their concerns to other unlikely instances of 
resistance—local, small-scale, unorganized, or those that function without a seeming 
attempt at overthrow of systems of oppression and domination—and expanded our notion 
of resistance and the many, complex forms it could take. The later ethnographic work of 
Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985), is a good 
example. Scott argues against what he sees as a trend in the literature to overemphasize 
peasant rebellions and revolutions and, instead, analyzes the everyday forms of 
Malaysian peasant resistance, the commonplace ways in which peasants historically have 
defended their interests in a constant, grinding struggle. Scott grapples with whether or 
not everyday forms of resistance, seemingly unorganized and incoherent and mobilized 
for immediate, pragmatic, modest gains, are “real” resistance and whether resistance must 
have as its goal an overt negation of the system of domination to count. For Scott, these 
unlikely forms are resistance. Such as the moments for a wide-spread rebellion or 
revolution are historically quite rare, and often crushed, these forms of everyday 
resistances may very well be the subordinate class’s only option as a sheer matter of the 
historical, political, economic context.  
An expansive definition of resistance allows scholars to consider other actions, 
discourses, and forms of resistance that may not fall within earlier theories of rebellion 
and Marxist-style revolution. In analyzing everyday or other unlikely forms of resistance, 
the challenge for scholars is to examine these acts of resistances as such and understand 
them within the their own terms and historical specific context, especially when, as Scott 
suggests, revolution may not be an option. In doing so, we can further complicate earlier 
reductionist theories and uncover the varied ways resistance works. The caution for 
scholars here is to examine resistances that may not tie to greater ideologies of liberation 
and to take care not to trivialize them inappropriately, reduce them to concepts such as 
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“false consciousness,” or present them as misguided or underdeveloped in comparison 
with revolutionary movements. To begin to address these concerns, scholars must 
develop the relationship of these types of resistance to power and the forms of 
domination that shape, define, and confine what resistances may look like.  
In her ethnographic work with Bedouin women, Abu-Lughod (1990), finding 
unlikely forms of resistance, argues for a significant theoretical shift in the way scholars 
continue to understand resistance and its relation to power. By reading resistance as the 
ineffectiveness of power and the refusal of domination, “we collapse distinctions between 
forms of resistance and foreclose certain questions about the workings of power” 
(1990:42). Abu-Lughod takes up Foucault’s widely known, abbreviated proposition, 
“where there is power, there is resistance” and inverts it: “where there is resistance, there 
is power” (1990:42). Though perhaps a more obvious claim, the switch assumes that 
there is resistance, and from that vantage point, allows us to reconsider the ways in which 
certain forms of resistance can serve as a diagnostic of domination and power. This 
theoretical shift requires us to open our analysis to the complex ways resistance and 
power function and interact.  
In his ethnography, Disparate Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African-
Nicaraguan Community (1998), Gordon candidly reveals his own disorientation when his 
theoretical leanings and political agendas, formed in his scholarly and political training in 
the United States, were not met with an expected shared engagement from either within 
the Sandinista Revolution or the Nicaraguan Creole populations. Looking beyond his pre-
developed conceptions of resistance and racial identity, Gordon’s careful analysis of the 
history and identity formations of Creole populations in eastern Nicaragua revealed a 
“common sense” seesawing between accommodation and resistance as the Creoles 
reacted to the Sandinista state. Gordon’s work suggests that, as scholars, we can navigate 
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and distinguish between respect for the specifics in context of resistances and our own 
political and analytical lens. Had Gordon (or I for that matter) insisted on pursuing a pre-
developed political project or held tightly to an analysis, he would most likely have 
overlooked the particular histories, local factors, and forms of power that shape 
resistance.  
However, this does not mean that the theoretical and political understandings of 
the scholar in the field are invalid or that they will not, or should not, be part of what 
might be shared with those who are resisting inequality and oppression. The objective for 
the scholar is to find a productive balance, both in the field and in scholarship, between 
the reality of resistance and his or her commitments to a particular politics and scholarly 
contributions. In my own work, the questions raised by my initial experiences in the field 
have challenged me to reconsider my methodological and analytical efforts in my 
approach to understand and work with the borrowers in protest. I analyze the protests and 
legal interventions of the movement against the microfinance institutions as practical, 
local resistance against a locally operating (though globally tied) system of power. The 
forms of resistance in this case are established to achieve concrete individual results (the 
renegotiation of loan terms for desperately indebted clients) and system-wide changes in 
the national microfinance industry (legal restriction on high interest rates, seizures of 
property, and incarcerations). Though the resistance does not take form like I had initially 
imagined, or romanticized, I continue to align myself politically with the movement in its 
quest for important and time-sensitive goals.  
In my commitment to scholarship, I find it productive to consider what these 
forms of resistance might expose about the complicated, varied forms of domination 
taking place and the way people are caught up in them. I understand the struggle of the 
MPCN as symptomatic of the relationship of microfinance to the oppression 
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characteristic of global neoliberal capitalism. Perhaps in some way this interpretation 
might be of some use to the struggle. What I hope to accomplish, in the end, is a balance 
between a thorough and respectful representation of the nature of the resistance of the 
movement and an analysis of the forms of resistance and domination at play.  
In preparation for fieldwork in the summer of 2009, I followed the regular news 
coverage of the demonstrations of the MPCN, their legislative battle, and the reactions 
from the microfinance sector in Nicaragua’s two major national newspapers, El Nuevo 
Diario and La Prensa. Through this and other archival research, I reconstructed a 
timeline of the early demonstrations and actions of the MPCN. I also began to collect 
some of the stories, arguments, and demands of protestors and leaders of the MPCN 
interviewed for the press. Similarly, I noted the arguments of representatives of the 
microfinance industry who articulated their position to the press as well as that of 
different state actors who participated in the debate. I also began researching Nicaragua’s 
history of economic development, particularly the microfinance sector and credit, to 
piece together the historical, political, and economic context to the present borrower 
crisis.  
I returned to northern Nicaragua for three months in 2009. I conducted open-
ended interviews and limited participant observation with borrowers who participate in 
the MPCN. I introduced myself to one of the regional leaders of the MPCN, Jose Padilla, 
who lives in the community where I stayed, and I interviewed with him in his home. I 
asked him about the demands and goals of the protests, the proposed legislation, and his 
perspectives on microfinance as economic development in general. He invited me to 
travel with him and a group of debtors to Managua to participate in one of several large 
demonstrations at the National Assembly in Managua in July 2009. In addition, I was 
invited inside the Assembly and into the observation room to witness the beginnings of a 
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debate on pending legislation in favor of renegotiations of the debts of the MPCN 
participants.  
During a four-hour drive and six-hour stand-in at the Assembly, I met dozens of 
borrowers. I took the opportunity created by my attendance at the large demonstration to 
solicit and conduct interviews with a select variety of participants. If I had not had the 
chance to meet MPCN participants in this way, I would have had to rely on the snowball 
method to obtain interviews, beginning with Mr. Padilla, and I would have had less 
opportunity to select different participants reflecting range of sex, occupation, and place 
of residence. Nonetheless, my interviewees were limited to those whom I met at the 
protests that day and exclude other borrowers who did not travel and participate the 
demonstration in Managua.  
Of the dozens of participants I met, I selected the interviewees based on gender 
and occupation or enterprise. Although I did not specifically ask about economic status, 
or select interviewees based on their economic position, I generally separated 
interviewees by those with relatively small business activities and those with somewhat 
larger productive enterprises. I spoke at length with seven borrowers who participated in 
the MPCN. The regional leader and two other male interviewees were landowners with 
small to medium-sized farms, and two other male interviewees were agricultural workers. 
Two of my interviewees were women who owned established businesses selling goods, 
and one other interviewee was a woman who sold products in the local market. Three 
interviewees were from the semi-rural town in which I stayed, and the others were from 
other areas in northern and central Nicaragua. I spoke informally with these seven 
participants about their debts, their challenges, and their perspectives on credit as well as 
their motivation to participate in the protests and their hopes for a resolution.  
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In addition to interviews with the protestors, I sought interviews with three 
managers of local branches of MFIs in one of the towns with a high level of protest 
targets. In one case, I cold solicited an interview by simply entering the MFI branch and 
introducing myself to the manager and explaining my research topic in general terms. We 
spoke at some length in her office, and while I asked several questions in regards to the 
protests and their claims, the manager was unwilling to speak about the topic. The 
interview focused on the mechanics of that specific MFI’s loan products and the 
manager’s perception of the role microfinance plays in the community. I relied on my 
personal social network to try to engage two other MFI managers; however, my requests 
for interviews were not granted.  
I also interviewed two local community news reporters who had covered the 
demonstrations. Both reporters, middle-aged men, recounted what they had witnessed 
and reported in regards to the MPCN protests. As long-time political reporters, they both 
drew wider connections to the national political and legal context as well as some 
historical antecedents to the crisis. These perspectives helped me to broaden my 
understanding and the scope of my analysis of the demands and motivations of the 
protestors, the MFI and community reactions, and the larger political and economic 
context around the microfinance industry in Nicaragua.   
Returning from the field, I monitored daily El Nuevo Diario and La Prensa online 
to track the coverage of the MPCN demonstrations and the path of the proposed 
legislation up to the summer of 2010.  
In the first chapter, I briefly introduce and outline the historical development of 
modern microfinance, its main principles and goals, and the more recent global trend 
prioritizing the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions. I also outline some of 
the more recent practical, theoretical, and ideological critiques of the microfinance 
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phenomenon. In the following chapter, I discuss microfinance as a discourse that supports 
neoliberal capitalism. I highlight the narratives of microfinance, the knowledges it 
produces, its position in economic system, and the subjectivities it creates. In the third 
chapter, I outline the history of economic development in Nicaragua from the 1980s 
Sandinista efforts to restructure the economic system to the post-1990 transition to the 
neoliberal capitalist-based approach to development. I focus in particular on the history 
of the provision of small-scale credit to target poor groups and the political shift from 
state-led distribution of credit to private institutional credit in the neoliberal era. In 
chapter four, I explore the development of microfinance in Nicaragua and the state of the 
microfinance sector, including some of the challenges and debates, to provide the context 
to the case study. In chapter five, I tell the story of the MPCN and detail their demands 
and proposals for change to the current system of small-scale credit. Then, I briefly 
describe the responses from the state and from the microfinance sector to the protests and 
legal demands. Finally, in the last chapter, I offer a discussion of the case of the MPCN 
and its significance for microfinance and market-led development.   
I have created pseudonyms or otherwise not used the names or any identifying 
information of the people participating in the MPCN. Some of the indebted persons 
participating in these protests do face the real risks of losing their homes and livelihoods. 
I am also sensitive to some of the negative public “shaming” against those who are not 
paying their debts. All translations from Spanish are mine. 
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Chapter 1: What is Microcredit? 
 
THE BEGINNINGS 
The provision of small loans to low-income individuals for small-scale, income-
generating activities is not a recent phenomenon. Small-scale finance for the poor has a 
long history and can include a variety of formal and informal structures, from 
moneylenders to state banks. Indigenous informal credit and saving associations have 
been identified in many societies; for example, anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote 
about indigenous credit and savings associations in the 1950s (Geertz 1956; Bouman 
1983). In the 1700s, Jonathan Swift inspired the creation of the Irish Loan Funds, which 
provided small loans to poor persons without collateral by requiring cosignatories and 
short-term weekly repayments (Hollis and Sweetman 2004). In the late 1800s, German 
Wilhelm Raiffeisen developed more formalized, member-owned rural credit unions to 
deliver credit to poor, often non-literate persons—a model that expanded through Europe 
(Shaffer 1999). In 1959, Akhtar-Hameed Khan through the Pakistan Academy for Rural 
Development developed cooperative community-based projects and group lending credit 
models, and in 1972, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a trade union, 
founded a cooperative bank to lend to its members (Khan 1985). 
Still, it is Bangladeshi economist Dr. Muhammad Yunus who is most widely 
credited as the pioneer of modern microfinance (United States Congressional Record 
2007; Dugger 2006; Smith and Thurman 2007; Counts 2008; Islam 2007; BBC News 
2006). The origin of microfinance is now a well-known story (Yunus 1994 and 2007; 
Counts 2008; Islam 2007). In the 1970s, Yunus, economics professor at Chittagong 
University, witnessed the devastation from war and famine in Bangladesh and its toll on 
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poor communities. Shocked by the overwhelming poverty, Yunus made regular visits to a 
neighboring low-income community where he observed poor women attempting to make 
a living by means of small-scale activities—raising chickens, making wooden stools, or 
selling food. These women, however, were unable to raise the level of capital needed to 
expand their activities and potentially increase their income and standard of living. When 
they did seek a loan from the informal option available to them—the moneylender—the 
terms of the loans and high collateral requirements and interest rates prevented the poor 
from making significant investments. He concluded that the greatest factor constraining 
the poor from working their way out of poverty was this lack of decent, low-cost capital 
to invest in their business activities. What these women needed were small, low-interest 
loans to invest in their businesses. Yunus begin an experiment in which he would provide 
small loans to the poor village women with no or little collateral. Yunus asked the women 
of the community to add up what they owed to the moneylender—40 loans for a total of 
$27. He paid off the moneylender, assumed the loans, and thus began his microlending 
program, the Grameen (meaning “village”) Bank.  
During the first few years, Yunus developed the terms of these “micro” loans and 
the delivery and recovery techniques. Yunus insisted on affordable interest rates for the 
borrowers so that poor entrepreneurs could reasonably invest and make enough profit to 
increase their household income and have a real chance of rising out of poverty. In the 
earliest years of the experiment, Grameen’s loans were structured with small weekly 
repayments, beginning one week after the loan disbursement, with an interest rate of 20 
percent. Grameen Bank required borrowers organize themselves in six non-related person 
support groups, called “solidarity circles.” The group aspect provided Grameen with 
several advantages. Members of the groups carefully self-selected responsible, reliable 
group members, and weeded out other individuals who may not have proven to be 
 15 
“creditworthy” clients. The group members collectively approved one member’s proposal 
and request for a loan. Loans were disbursed to two members of the group at a time, and 
pending timely repayments, loans would be distributed to two additional members. If one 
member of the group defaulted, all members were held jointly liable. The group dynamic 
provided the peer pressure to ensure full and prompt repayment of loans and to ensure 
access to future loans for all borrowers in the group. The group self-selection and 
approval process and the social pressure to repay provided “social collateral” in place of 
physical collateral guarantees and lessened the credit risk for Grameen. 
From the beginning of the project, Yunus focused in particular on female 
borrowers. Yunus argued, and continues to argue, that women ought to be the focus of 
poverty alleviation programs because women experience poverty more intensely than 
men and improvements in the economic and social conditions of the household are 
greater when the process of change is initiated through the woman head of household (see 
Yunus 1994 and 2007). Women, Yunus argues, are better fighters against poverty: they 
are willing to make sacrifices and work harder to lift their families out of poverty and 
protect their and their children’s future and dignity. Moreover, women are more 
responsible and cautious, and therefore more capable and likely to repay.  
In terms of repayment, the poor, especially poor women, turned out to be good 
credit clients. Yunus boasted a near perfect repayment rate (as high as 98 percent) as 
proof that his model worked and that the poor were bankable. Moreover, with such high 
repayment rates, Yunus argued that the Grameen Bank had the potential to function 
without donor subsidy as a financially viable institution. Witnessing the reported success 
of the Grameen Bank, development practitioners and donor agencies hailed the unique 
microlending techniques developed by Yunus as “revolutionary” in terms of successfully 
overcoming traditional barriers to lending to the poor through potentially sustainable 
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institutions (Islam 2007). Yunus promoted microcredit as a poverty reduction and 
development policy and program to the international donors, and by the end of the 
decade, the development community had taken special interest in the potential of 
microfinance.  
Alongside the development of the Grameen Bank, other institutions began their 
experiments with microfinance for the poor: the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in 1972 and ASA in 1978. The 
Latin American NGO ACCION established a microfinance program, PRODEM, in 
Bolivia in 1986. Since the 1980s, other Grameen-like programs have been developed in 
countries around the world. The Grameen lending model is often cited as an “ideal” 
model and credited as the best success story in microfinance industry and in the public 
imagination (Counts 2008; McLeod Arnopoulos 2010; Islam 2007). The Grameen model 
techniques—particularly the group or solidarity lending model, small loans with 
immediate and short-term repayment schedules, and the major focus on women clients—
have dominated microfinance methodologies over the past 20 years (Islam 2007).  
Muhammad Yunus remains the public face of microfinance and the Grameen 
Bank is a major force in the global industry. In 2006, Yunus and the Grameen Bank were 
jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to create economic and social 
development from below.” The press release from the award reads, “Lasting peace can 
not be achieved unless large population groups find ways in which to break out of 
poverty…. From modest beginnings three decades ago, Yunus has, first and foremost 
through Grameen Bank, developed micro-credit into an ever more important instrument 
in the struggle against poverty” (Nobelprize.org 2011). In 2010, according to MIX data, 
the Grameen Bank served over 8.3 million active borrowers and held a loan portfolio of 
over US$939 million (MIX 2011). 
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THE PRINCIPLES AND GOALS OF MICROCREDIT 
Microfinance is broadly defined as the provision of financial services, 
predominantly credit, to poor borrowers for the purpose of investments in small-scale 
business activities or microenterprise.1 Supporters present microfinance as an alternative 
intervention in an imperfect credit market created by the failures of both formal 
(commercial banks) and informal (the moneylender) credit sources to meet the financial 
needs of the poor. Traditional commercial banks’ loan programs tend to exclude poor and 
rural populations due to the high risk and high costs associated with lending to these 
groups (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). In the absence of traditional bank credit, a poor 
person seeking access to capital may turn to other informal sources of credit, such as 
family or other social networks, or the local moneylender. The moneylender, often a 
member of the same community as the borrower, has the advantage over traditional 
banks: easy access to information about the borrower and the ability to exert social 
pressure and other tactics to ensure repayment. In microfinance literature, moneylenders 
are represented as exploitative monopolists squeezing the poor with excessively high 
interest rates and aggressive, controlling contracts (Yunus 1994; Smith and Thurman 
2007; Armendariz and Morduch 2005).2 Reports of annualized interest rates of 60, 70 and 
up to 159 percent charged by informal moneylenders support the claims about the 
                                                
1 “Microfinance” refers to a range of financial services, such as credit, savings, insurance, and money 
transfers. The overwhelming majority of the microfinance sector is dedicated to the delivery of microcredit, 
although there has been a more recent push to expand services to include savings and insurance for the poor 
where possible. For this thesis, I use the two terms, microfinance and microcredit, interchangeably.  
2 Whether moneylenders are exploitive or are offering valuable, quick financial services for many people in 
their community is debated in Armendariz and Murdoch (2005). Some reports suggest that the availability 
of more formal finance does not replace the role of informal moneylenders and moneylenders play a 
significant role in money lending within their communities (Ghate 2007; Choudhury 2000).  
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negative role of the moneylender in the credit market for the poor.3 Microfinance 
provides the poor with the option of a more formal or institutional, and ideally lower cost, 
source of credit than informal moneylenders.  
Microfinance practitioners and supporters claim that microfinance credit offers 
the poor the opportunity to escape poverty by investing in small income-generating 
activities (Yunus 1994; Armendariz and Morduch 2005). With a lump investment, 
advocates argue, the poor have the potential to significantly increase labor, production 
and output, and therefore household income.4 The higher income they can potentially 
earn can be used both to repay the loan and reinvest in the micro-activity to create a 
virtuous cycle: low income, credit, investment, more income, more credit, more 
investment, and more income (Islam 2007). With a potentially stable increase in income, 
poor borrowers can boost assets, savings, and consumption levels and more successfully 
regulate fluctuations in lump spending needs—such as education or familial 
obligations—and economic shocks, such as sudden health-related costs or natural 
disasters.  
Microfinance supporters thus argue that microcredit can “empower” the poor to 
take control of their economic situation and, with hard work and financial responsibility, 
lift themselves out of their personal poverty. Through microfinance, the poor are included 
in global financial systems and markets as rational investors in small business activities. 
Microcredit recipients are no longer imagined and treated as beneficiaries of development 
aid, but rather as active participants in their own development as responsible managers of 
                                                
3 Singh (1968) reports annualized interest rates up to 159 percent in informal markets in Punjab, India. 
Siamwalla et al. (1990) find rates from 60 to 120 percent. Aleem (1990) finds rates on average of 70 
percent and up to 200 percent; and in contrast, local banks reportedly charged an average of 12 percent 
annually.  
4 The Baker-Hopkin economic model of credit argues that as long as the return on assets (from the 
productive investment in an enterprise) is greater than the interest paid, credit will lead to an increase in the 
income of the household that received the loan (see Armendariz and Murdoch [2005] and Islam [2007]).  
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credit resources. Donors and investors have cast microcredit in terms of a helpful “hand 
up” out of poverty as opposed to a charitable (welfare) “hand out” (Yunus 2007; Smith 
and Thurman 2007). In other words, microfinance has the potential to elevate the dignity 
and self-esteem of the poor. 
A vast amount of literature has emerged to support, and adjudicate, the impact of 
microcredit in the social and economic lives of women clients (Goetz and Sen Gupta 
1994; Ackerly 1995; Rahman 1986; Pitt and Khandker 1995; Hashemi et al 1996; Kabeer 
2009; Meenai 2003; Burra, Deshmukh-Ranadive, and Murthy 2005; Rahman 1999; for a 
discussion on gender and microfinance in Nicaragua, see Nitlapán 2002). Microfinance 
supporters argue that many women in developing societies lack access to credit services 
due to constraints such as higher levels of poverty, male guarantor requirements, cultural 
barriers, low levels of literacy, limited mobility, and legal claims to collateral (Cheston 
and Kuhn 2002). Through microcredit, a small infusion of cash to establish or expand 
some sort of economic activity, the female client gains a greater level of control over her 
household’s income and her family’s wellbeing. Microcredit supporters claim that 
microfinance empowers women through its potential to give women greater ownership of 
resources, economic independence, and a role in household decision-making (Mayoux 
1995; GCAP 2010). With access to credit, women gain additional access to financial and 
business spheres through their participation in public markets. If the women participate in 
a group lending structure, they may benefit from social networks and support with their 
peers. Through these benefits, it is argued, women may achieve greater confidence and 
self-respect. Believing in the power of credit to liberate the poor and especially poor 
women, Yunus has called for the right to access credit to be treated as a basic human 
right (Yunus 2010). 
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Women, the traditional caregivers for the family, are also considered to be more 
likely than men to use additional income to support the household welfare (Yunus 2007; 
Elson 1995, Cheston and Kuhn 2002). Arguments have also been made for targeting 
women on grounds of efficiency and sustainability, as conventional microfinance wisdom 
has held that women are more cooperative and repay their loans at higher rates than men 
(Yunus 1994 and 2007; Cheston and Kuhn 2002). As participants in microcredit, women 
are presented as contributors to and agents in local development processes.  
In addition to the potential to reduce household poverty, microfinance advocates 
argue that investment in microfinance and the microenterprise sectors can contribute to 
bottoms-up economic development in local communities. The idea resonates with well-
known Peruvian thinker Hernando de Soto’s theory that the informal sector in Latin 
America would provide the critical foundation for sustainable economic development in 
the region (1989). Robinson (2001) suggests that microfinance can create hubs of 
microenterprise activity, and micro-business growth can lead to a local community’s rise 
out of poverty. The increase in productive activity at the “micro,” and often informal, 
level can stimulate greater local purchasing and selling of materials and products; 
introduce new, relatively cheap goods in local and national supply chains; and positively 
influence the wage rate in labor markets (see Bateman’s [2010] analysis). Moreover, self-
employment of the poor in small-scale productive activities can alleviate the local 
economic pressure of high formal unemployment rates. With the help of microfinance, 
the theory suggests, a flourishing microenterprise sector may form the basis of a 
developing economy and lead to long-term economic growth (Robinson 2001; also see 
discussion in Dichter 2007 and Bateman 2010). 
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SECOND-GENERATION MICROFINANCE: SUSTAINABILITY TO COMMERCIALIZATION 
By the end of the 1980s, the budding microfinance sector was forced to deal with 
the question of ongoing subsidies to sustain microcredit operations. Most early MFIs 
established following the Grameen Bank were structured as non-profit NGOs and were 
initially capitalized with external donor support. Although high repayment rates 
suggested potential for long-term financial viability, after years of operation, it became 
clear that many MFIs were dependent on regular injections of subsidized capital—
government or private donations or low-interest loans from development banks—to cover 
the costs of operations (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Reports on the Grameen Bank 
suggested that Yunus inflated his claims of near perfect repayment rates, and exposed the 
famous MFI’s continued reliance on government and private donor subsidy (Morduch 
1999). Microcredit, it turned out, was not quite the self-sustaining or financially viable 
approach to poverty reduction as the international donor community had originally 
hoped.  
On the subsidy debate, microfinance faced an ideological schism (Morduch 
2009). Many microfinance practitioners justified the need for continued donor subsidy 
based on their mission to improve the lives of the poor (Bateman 2010). The poverty 
lending approach, exemplified by the Grameen Bank in its earliest form, emphasizes the 
end goal of microfinance as the reduction of poverty and empowerment of the poor and 
views subsidy as necessary to achieve that goal. Others, though, reject the idea of 
dependency on subsidies and, rather, position the end goal of microfinance as the 
provision of sustainable financial services to poor and non-poor borrowers, formally 
called the financial systems approach.  
In order to achieve sustainable institutions, financial systems microfinance takes 
on a market-oriented, for-profit business-like structure to its credit programs. MFIs 
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expand the scale of lending, increase the volume of loans disbursed per borrower, 
increase rates and fees, and tighten repayment discipline by enforcing punitive strategies 
(Kalpana 2005). Most significantly, under this approach, microcredit interests and fees 
are determined by the market and must reflect the full administrative, recovery and 
expansion costs of the loan. Recuperated client repayments plus interests and fees cover 
all of the operational costs of the institution. Financially sustainable institutions, experts 
reasoned, would lead to improved (or at least more efficient) financial services to the 
poor and would potentially lead to exponential growth to serve more and more poor 
clients (Christen and Drake 2002). Importantly, the success of sustainable microfinance is 
judged overwhelmingly, if not solely, on the basis of the financial self-sustainability of 
the institution and not on the impact on the client’s economic situation.  
Those who promote the “financial systems” approach to microfinance readily 
embraced the idea of the commercialization of microfinance institutions. The 
commercialization of microfinance generally includes the transformation of non-profit 
MFIs into for-profit, regulated financial institutions. The heart of commercialization is its 
focus on profitability and therefore financial stability and viability. For a MFI, having 
regulated commercial status translates to greater opportunity to attract outside 
investments from commercial lenders as well as public funding and, importantly, often 
affords the legal option to capture consumer savings deposits (Drake and Rhyne 2002). 
Those who argue that microfinance ought to move in the direction of commercialization 
suggest that the transformation is a critical step to provision of high quality professional 
services to the poor. Commercialized institutions, now in competition with one another in 
the market and under the pressure to scale services, would be forced to create innovative, 
client-centered products in order to retain and gain new clients (Christen and Drake 
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2002). The trend toward the commercialization of microfinance reflects the commitment 
to a market approach to microfinance and the goals of efficiency and sustainability.  
In the late 1980s, USAID began to support the “second-generation” microfinance 
focused on the financial sustainability of institutions. Soon afterward, the World Bank 
began to provide significant technical advice and financial support for microfinance 
programs. In 1995, the World Bank established the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest (CGAP; later changed from “Poorest” to “Poor”), a multi-donor institution 
dedicated to the promotion of the sustainable microfinance. The MicroCredit Summit 
Campaign, launched in the mid-1990s, solidified the idea of financially sustainable, 
commercial microfinance as the mainstream microfinance model (Bateman 2010). First-
world for-profit investors began to take interest in the commercial microfinance model as 
not only a way to help the poor and reduce poverty, but as a smart and profitable 
investment (see, for example, Smith and Thurman 2007). 
In 1992, Bolivia’s PRODEM was the first institution to transform from a non-
profit NGO, established with support from USAID and other private sector funding, into 
a fully state-regulated commercial bank, BancoSol (Rhyne [2001 and 2002] documents 
the transformation and rise of BancoSol). As a regulated microcredit entity, BancoSol 
quickly became the most profitable bank in Bolivia. Advocates of microfinance 
commercialization hailed BancoSol’s apparent success as evidence that microfinance in 
fact translates into a highly lucrative business model (Christen and Drake 2002). In 1997, 
BancoSol issued dividends to its shareholders—a first in microfinance history. 
Throughout the 1990s, the BancoSol example fostered interest in replicating its NGO 
transformation model.  
By the mid-1990s, microfinance supporters promoted the financial systems and 
commercialization models of microfinance as industry “best practices” (Bateman 2010). 
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As the international development community and microfinance practitioners focused on 
ways to best create sustainable microfinance, the early poverty reduction models quietly 
fell to the wayside and out of the mainstream. The commercialization of microfinance 
was embraced by industry leaders and sought after as its prime objective (Christen and 
Drake 2002). As development expert Bateman argues, “‘New wave’ [commercialized] 
microfinance was now the definition of microfinance, not just one of a number of 
possibilities” (2010:19, emphasis in original).  
The transformation from a non-profit to a regulated MFI, however, is complicated 
and expensive. To gain status as a regulated institution requires that there are capable 
institutions and procedures in place in a given country to regulate and supervise the 
transformed institutions.  In many countries, this regulatory framework does not exist, or 
MFIs cannot easily be incorporated into the existing framework. Many MFIs have 
maintained their status as non-profit NGOs, but industry experts and external donors and 
investors have insisted on policy and programmatic changes, primarily by establishing 
market-based interest rates, to bring MFIs in line with a commercial approach.  
In 2001, under external pressures to conform to these new “mainstream” 
principles, the Grameen Bank transformed its microlending model into the Grameen II 
project. Although Yunus has always argued to keep interest rates as low as possible in 
order to give more opportunity to the poor to experience significant change, Grameen II 
implemented measures to raise interest rates to near market rates. The new model also 
required borrowers to deposit a portion of their loan into Grameen savings accounts. In 
the first three years of the Grameen II project, the Grameen Bank’s net profits increased 
six-fold (Islam 2007). The new Grameen model broke from its original methods, and the 
result was a highly profitable microfinance operation. 
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CRITIQUES OF MICROFINANCE 
More recently, scholars, development experts, and even microfinance 
practitioners have expressed their concerns with the practical, theoretical and ideological 
underpinnings of the mainstream microfinance model and have challenged the central 
claims of its economic impact on poor households and local poverty reduction (for 
example, Adams and von Pischke 1992; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Kalpana 2005; Dichter 
2006; Ellerman 2007; Bateman 2010; Rosenberg 2010). Critics raise critical questions 
about microfinance and its assumptions and warn about the potential harm from the 
overinflated hype around the sector. In this section, I highlight a few of the critiques of 
the microfinance model.  
Scholars, industry experts, and microfinance practitioners have noted the absence 
of robust quantitative or qualitative research on the socioeconomic impact of microcredit 
on clients (Armendariz and Murdoch 2005; Goldberg 2005; Bateman 2010; Meyer 2007; 
Rosenberg 2010). Previous attempts to measure microcredit results failed to use controls 
and exclude all other possible factors in the interpretation of results (Ellerman 2007; 
Meyer 2007; Gulli 1998; Armendariz and Murdoch 2005; for a summary of impact 
studies, see Goldberg 2005). Roodman and Murdoch (2009) recently raised serious 
doubts about the validity of one of the most often cited impact study that had 
demonstrated significant increases in socioeconomic benefits for clients. In recent years, 
a small number of randomized control studies have only demonstrated mixed results in 
short-term outcomes for household welfare and standard of living (Rosenberg 2010; 
Bateman 2010). Two of these studies found no improvement in household income or 
increase in consumption (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan 2009 and Karlan and 
Zinman 2009). The one study that did find improvements in welfare was a study on the 
impact of savings, not microcredit, for poor clients (Dupas and Robinson 2011).  
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Rosenberg concludes that “(f)or now, it seems an honest summary of the evidence 
to say that we simply do not know yet whether microcredit or other forms of 
microfinance are helping to lift millions out of poverty” (2010:1). In the judgment of 
Roodman and Morduch, “Strikingly, 30 years into the microfinance movement we have 
little solid evidence that it improves the lives of clients in measureable ways” (2009:3). 
Despite decades of excited claims of the benefits of microfinance and hundreds of 
positive anecdotes, we simply do not know how it impacts the lives of the poor.  
Small, short-term, high-interest loans are by nature incompatible with the very 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the poor and the poor working in the informal and small 
business sectors. The poor do not just have low income, but often irregular and uncertain 
income, which can make it difficult for them to meet inflexible and regular loan 
repayment schedules. Moreover, the poor are particularly vulnerable to economic shocks. 
Even if a microcredit client may experience an increase in income as a result of an ideal 
microcredit cycle, he or she may not necessarily experience a significant decrease in their 
overall economic vulnerability (Hulme and Mosley 1996). 
The microcredit model relies on the notion that the poor can and will use the 
microcredit to invest rationally in a business activity, and the loan can be repaid 
successfully by drawing on increased profits from the business. Microcredit assumes that 
the rate of return on any micro-activity will be regular and high enough to ensure 
successful repayment. But not all activities, and particularly activities in the very small 
business and informal sectors, yield equally positive or consistent results. The injection of 
credit into a productive activity does not guarantee a successful business outcome (profit) 
to support loan and interest repayment. Moreover, the microfinance model overlooks the 
potential for business failure, complete loss of investment, and the consequences that may 
have on the borrower. Hulme writes, “(N)ot all microdebt produces favorable results, 
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especially for poor people working in low-return activities in saturated markets that are 
poorly developed and where environmental and economic shock are common” (2007:19). 
Several studies have shown that microcredit loan monies are commonly not used 
for investment, but rather for lump spending needs, emergencies, and basic consumption 
(Rutherford 2000; Dichter 2007). In such cases, there is no expected financial return and 
no greater earned profit from a business activity to repay the loan with interest. To repay 
their loans, microcredit clients may be forced into taking out another loan or selling 
household goods, which in turn may lead them into deeper poverty than before they 
accessed their microloan.  
Is credit what the poor want? The microcredit literature often assumes that there is 
an unmet demand for credit services among current clients and millions of other poor not 
yet served by microfinance (see for example, Robinson 2001). Allen (2007) argues that 
the poor, by nature of their economic vulnerability, are especially risk adverse. Several 
studies have shown that many and in some cases a majority of poor individuals choose 
not to take out a microloan, often either because they did not have the need or because 
they did not want the debt (Navajas and Tejerina 2006; Magill and Meyer 2005; Johnston 
and Morduch 2007). In an enlightening study, Rutherford (2000) suggests that the poor 
express a need and desire for reliable, secure savings as a means to regulate income and 
spending needs. Poor households save money, often in their homes or through informal 
savings deposit collectors or associations (Rutherford 2000). Historically, microfinance 
institutions have focused primarily on credit services, and microsavings—as a part of 
microfinance services—is still largely unavailable to most microcredit clients and the 
poor (Hulme 2007).  
Is microcredit “empowering” the poor and, in particular, poor women? A large 
number of studies seem to indicate that microfinance can have a positive impact on the 
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personal, social, and economic empowerment of its clients (Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley 
1997; Todd 1996; Burra, Deshmukh-Ranadive, and Murthy 2005). However, other 
studies, particularly those that take into account clients who exited a lending program, 
also show the real potential for borrowers to experience disempowerment as a result of 
their use of microcredit (Rahman 1999; Karim 2005). The flip side of microcredit might 
also be looked at as micro-“debt.” Dichter (2007) argues that this switch in language 
allows for a deeper discussion on the range of experiences for clients of microfinance and 
calls attention to the potential burden of credit. Borrowers who struggle to make use of 
their loan to generate income and who enter into default may spiral into further debt 
through late fees, sacrifice family needs or sell assets to be able to repay, or lose property 
to asset seizures. The borrowers may also face sociological effects related to harassment, 
peer pressure, shame and a loss of social status. In an extreme case, a number of 
borrowers in Andhra Pradesh, India reportedly committed suicide over their microdebts 
with MFIs accused of exercising usurious interest rates and excessive loan recovery 
practices (Shylendra 2006; The Economist 2010). 
As discussed above, a great number of studies suggest that in certain cases, 
women may benefit economically, psychologically and socially from their involvement 
in microfinance. Impact evaluations of a female client’s self-esteem, role in household 
decision-making, and increase in knowledge are complicated, and results from client 
studies have been mixed (Fouillet and Palier 2005). Not all women experience positive 
outcomes, and an increasing number of studies caution about the negative experiences 
women in particular may face as borrowers of microcredit (see Guerin and Palier 2005). 
Some studies of women’s access to and use of microcredit have revealed cases in which 
women lose control of credit monies to their male partners and suffer greater domestic 
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violence or face negative social pressure from other women in borrower groups (Goetz 
and Sen Gupta 1996; Rahman 1999). 
 Moreover, scholars warn that the targeting of women by microfinance runs the 
risk of essentializing women and their gender roles (Rankin 2001). Women are the 
special targets of microfinance because of their very economic and social vulnerability 
and unequal position in social hierarchies. As Rankin writes, “(T)he new agents of 
development are gendered as women entrepreneurs with cultural propensities to invest 
wisely and look after their families and communities” (2001:20). It is these same 
characteristics—wisdom and responsibilities—that make a woman more likely to repay 
her loan (Kabeer 1994). Deshmukh-Ramadive broadly defines empowerment as “a 
process that takes place when inequalities move toward equality” (2005:114). However, 
microfinance may place greater burdens on already disenfranchised women by placing 
the responsibility for development on their shoulders (Rankin 2001).  
Through microfinance, poor borrowers are invited to participate in development, 
but only in terms of their consumption of credit. Most typically, they are not able to 
participate in the decision-making within microfinance institutions, state politics, or 
regional or global development agencies (Rankin 2001; Devi 2005; Sundaraarajan 2005). 
As Mohanty (2001) suggests, microfinance supporters often use the term 
“empowerment” in a way that implies that an outside agent (the lending institution) 
grants power to the poor. This, however, does not constitute a real redistribution of 
power. Moreover, Mohanty argues, the poor are encouraged to exercise power over their 
lives, but only to do so without disrupting greater power structures. Microfinance may do 
little to challenge larger structural and social inequalities that the poor, and especially 
poor women, continue to face (Guerin and Palier 2005). For instance, the use of 
microfinance does not directly affect hierarchical, patriarchal relationships and structures 
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within households and communities (Deshmukh-Ramadive 2005; Thampi 2005). At 
worst it may exacerbate exiting inequalities and contribute to the prevailing system of 
economic domination (Rankin 2001; Kalpana 2005).   
The new wave of interest in the commercialization of microfinance has 
introduced new challenges within the global microfinance sector. Some practitioners 
reject the requirements of commercialization and its emphasis on return and expansion as 
a drift away from the original mission of microfinance (for example, Wilson 2007). 
Under the pressure to scale up to achieve financial stability, MFIs must lend more by 
incorporating more and more clients and making bigger loans. This has led MFIs to 
transition to a client base of those at or above the poverty line and the non-poor. In one 
argument, these larger loans to the non-poor help the MFI to subsidize the many small 
loans to the poor (Armendariz and Szafarz 2009). From another perspective, this may 
mean that an MFI may slowly drop its poorer clients for the sake of financial gain 
(Christen and Drake 2002). 
Once microfinance institutions commit to operating on a commercial rather than a 
poverty-lending basis, the market environment fosters increased competition (Christen 
and Drake 2002). In theory, competition will lead to client-centered changes in loan 
product design, pricing, or delivery mechanisms to order to retain and gain clients 
(Rosenberg, Gonzalez and Narain 2009). However, in effort to expand rapidly in 
increasingly saturated markets, MFIs may turn to questionable practices. In 2006, a crisis 
in Andhra Pradesh raised critical questions about the eager growth of microfinance and 
its repercussions. As Ghate (2007) explains, the rush to expand services in one of the 
region’s most saturated microfinance market, led to a neglect of client-focused practices. 
MFIs in Andhra Pradesh had deceived clients on interest rates, fees, and terms of the 
loans; turned to coercive collection practices; and over-lent to over-indebted clients. The 
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national press reported on a number of suicides of borrowers who were indebted and 
faced abusive collection pressures. The local government intervened and temporarily 
closed almost all of the MFI branches in the region. The case is complex and beyond the 
scope of this thesis; however, it points to the potential dangers of excessive growth and 
hypercompetition in microfinance markets.  
In 2007, the transformation of Compartamos, the largest microfinance institution 
in Mexico, to a regulated commercial entity ultimately challenged the overwhelming 
drive to the commercialization of microfinance. Microfinance supporters had rallied 
behind the commercialization of Compartamos and hailed it as the next example of 
successful commercial microfinance. However, the transformation process revealed the 
MFI’s gross practices and incredible profits. While charging high interest rates—up to 
100 percent—to its poor female borrowers, Compartamos executives reaped salaries and 
bonuses of tens of millions of dollars (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Yunus publicly 
rebuked the greed and excess of the Compartamos executives and compared their 
practices to those of loan sharks. He also warned of the negative fallout of the disaster 
and referred to the revelation as the end of microfinance (Epstein and Smith 2007). The 
revelation underscores the concerns with a commercial, market-focused approach to 
serving the poor. However, despite the Compartamos experience, leaders in the global 
microfinance industry continue to argue that the path to commercialization is the 
foremost objective.  
The commercialization of microfinance has also created a perhaps unexpected 
paradox. Commercialization of microfinance has led private commercial banks to expand 
their lending to poor, rural clients who were traditionally excluded from formal bank 
credit. Microfinance, after all, has supposedly proven to the financial world that the poor 
are bankable. Also, private commercial banks have the financial strength, access to 
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technology, and legal environments that can allow them to overcome the very service and 
scalability problems with which commercializing MFIs continue to struggle. As Christen 
and Drake (2002) suggest, it may be the case that traditional commercial banks can 
provide better, more client-centered microfinance services to the poor than can MFIs.  
Does microfinance lead to economic development and poverty reduction? While 
the premise of microfinance is its potential to foment economic development, in his 
recent book, Bateman (2010) argues that the dominant microfinance model has not 
clearly resulted in significant local sustainable poverty reduction or economic 
development in any developing or transition economy. For example, Ellerman asks, “(I)s 
Bangladesh [the birthplace of modern microfinance and one of the most saturated 
markets] on anyone’s list of development success stories?” (2007:151). After thirty years 
of microfinance development, there is little evidence that credit for microentrepreneurs 
leads to long-term local economic growth and poverty reduction.  
Dichter (2007) examines the historical economic development of present-day 
developed nations and role of credit in small enterprise development, and he finds that 
there is little connection between widespread access of credit to the poor or small 
businesses and larger-scale economic growth. Before and during economic development, 
financing for business start-ups and small businesses in these countries primarily came 
from self-savings or from informal credit sources, such as loans from family or social 
networks, and not from formal, institutional credit. Formal credit was reserved for 
established medium to large-sized businesses. The general use of formalized credit for 
small business activity was a result of economic growth, not a requirement for it.  
Moreover, Dichter’s historical analysis reveals that the early development of 
widespread financial services for the poor followed economic development, industrial 
growth, and job creation, and was based primarily on savings, not credit. The mass use of 
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credit followed the savings movement and was linked to consumption by the working 
poor. He concludes that while the microfinance movement has assumed that credit is a 
precondition for economic development, “history seems to be telling us clearly that 
economic development and its consequent massive poverty reduction did not depend on 
microcredit being made more accessible for income production or asset acquisition by the 
poor” (2007:191).   
Ellerman argues that microfinance may serve as a poverty relief program rather 
than a development assistance intervention. He suggests that microfinance transferred 
limited resources into the hands of the poor but does not lead to economic development 
(2007). Bateman (2007 and 2010) is even more critical of the intervention of 
microfinance as a means to development and poverty reduction. He argues that 
microfinance may in fact serve as an anti-development intervention in developing and 
transition economies and may harm the potential for significant industrialization, job 
creation, and sustainable growth.  
Microfinance assumes that credit can spur microenterprise development as a 
means to achieve bottoms-up economic growth. With credit, the poor can start up or 
invest in some small income-generating activity, most often in the informal market. The 
informal market is generally the space where one offers the most basic goods and 
services of a means of survival existence or subsistence living. The low-productive 
activities many microcredit clients undertake in the informal sectors are those that 
generate some of the lowest profits and incomes and are highly vulnerable to price 
fluctuations and competition (Bateman 2010; Malhotra 1992). With increased availability 
of microcredit for microenterprises, the result may be an over-supply of many similar 
informal, non-industrial basic income-generating activities. The local economy quickly 
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becomes saturated with microenterprises in heightened competition, with high risk and 
vulnerability for failures.  
While a microenterprise employs generally one person or household in the 
informal sector, the investment in microenterprise, however, rarely leads to the creation 
of new or more formal jobs. There is little evidence that these microactivities eventually 
evolve into more formal enterprises and stable small to medium-sized businesses with the 
capacity to create employment opportunities. Bateman concludes that the focus on 
microcredit for growth and development instead creates infantile informal economies of 
many self-employed individuals in basic, low-productive activities. 
As Bateman argues, the mass investment in microfinance from external 
development aid agencies, banks, and investors directs valuable resources away from 
macroeconomic interventions that have greater potential to stimulate more rapid and 
long-term growth, such as more larger-scale commerce and industry, skilled worker 
training, and technologies to improve productivity. The attention on microfinance also 
deters from investment in public projects that assist the poor, such as investment in 
health, education, and infrastructure. Such infantile local economies create greater import 
dependency. The introduction of microfinance, Bateman suggests, may in fact halt or 
slow local chances for sustainable economic growth and progress and thus mass poverty 
reduction (Bateman 2010).  
The numerous and growing challenges to the microfinance model have challenged 
the overinflated expectations of microfinance’s potential outcomes for poverty reduction 
and development. Dichter and Harper (2007) explain that there has been a certain level of 
“push back” by the poor, by some large microfinance practitioners who quit their lending 
programs, and by governments concerned about microfinance practices. At the very least, 
these critiques begin to open up a broader discussion about the practice and nature of 
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microfinance and the reality of its impact on the lives of the poor and in the development 
of economies.  In more recent years, some of the excitement over microfinance may have 
waned, but there is little evidence that microfinance practices and the larger development 
trends that support it will change dramatically in the near future. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework: Microfinance as Discourse 
 
The most accurate location for the microfinance model is within the most 
fundamentalist and anti-poor variant of capitalism: neoliberalism.  
 
Milton Bateman, Why Microfinance Doesn’t Work: the Destructive Rise of 
Local Neoliberalism (2010:165) 
 
The idea of microfinance emerged as development experts and policy makers 
began to turn their attention away from macroeconomic development projects and from 
external donor or state-led models of rural and poverty finance. In the mid-twentieth 
century, many developing countries created large state-controlled rural development and 
agricultural finance programs to support rural productive and agricultural sectors (Adams 
and von Pischke 1992). These finance programs provided government- or international 
donor-funded subsidized credit to producers and small farmers in efforts to increase 
productive activity and implement new technologies (Dichter 2007; Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005). Increasing productivity, it was argued, would increase labor demand and 
wages and stimulate the rural and national economy.  
However, first-world development practitioners and donors eventually discredited 
state-led financing models for development for reported inefficiency, low recovery rates, 
clientelism, corruption, and the perpetuation of dependency on subsidy (Adams, Graham, 
and von Pischke 1984; Adams and von Pischke 1992; Rankin and Shakya 2007; 
Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Following the critique of state development models and 
early agricultural credit programs, the World Bank noted that “new means of structuring 
relationships with the poor are required” (von Pischke, Bennet, and Goldberg 1993:5). 
Microfinance, as a private, market-based approach to poverty reduction, appeared to be a 
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promising alternative development model. Microfinance promised to replace the onerous 
state and its inefficient state banks and to deliver more credit to target groups while 
reducing costs and expanding benefits (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). By the end of 
the 1980s, increasing international interest elevated microfinance to become the 
prevailing economic development initiative for third world countries.  
Weber argues that the idea that microfinance is an effective intervention for 
poverty alleviation holds the status of a hegemonic discourse (2002 and 2004). Here I 
define discourse as historically situated, structured forms and patterns of knowledge that 
construct and constrain possible meanings and shape social reality and subjects. 
Discourses are not just expressions of social practice, and discourse is located not only in 
language but also in institutions, practices, and social relations (Wodak and Meyer 2009). 
Discourse guides individual and collective creation of reality, Jager and Maier (2009) 
argue, by creating subjects as co-producers and co-agents of discourses. As Jager and 
Maier explain, “(D)iscourses exert power because they transport knowledge on which 
collective and individual knowledge feeds. This knowledge is the basis for individual and 
collective, discursive and non-discursive action, which in turn shapes reality” (2009:39). 
Dominant discourse produces and reproduces social domination and the abuse of one 
group over another. Moreover, as Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue, discourse shapes how 
dominated groups may resist the abuses of power. In this chapter, I explore the nature of 
microfinance as a discourse through the dominant narratives it produces and reproduces, 
the privileged rationality (ways of knowing) it emphasizes, the underlying economic 
system to which it is tied, and the subjectivities it forms. 
Microfinance advocates have consistently celebrated the positive results of 
microcredit programs and constructed a hugely optimistic narrative around the 
microfinance model. High repayment rates are often cited as decisive evidence of a 
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successfully completed loan, and the increase in the number of clients and loans made are 
noted as proof of borrower demand and need for these microcredit services. MFIs and 
microfinance supporters report countless individual stories of poor entrepreneurial clients 
who creatively invested their loans and realized a positive impact in their lives (see for 
example, Yunus 1994; Counts 2008; McLeod Arnopoulos 2010; Bornstein 1997; IADB 
2006; ACCION 2010).  
Industry practitioners and supporters have generally made blanket presumptive 
claims that microfinance will result in positive outcomes for its client borrowers and their 
communities. The United Nations declared 2005 the International Year of Microcredit 
with a statement reading, “Microcredit has been changing people's lives and revitalizing 
communities since the beginning of the trade. Currently microentrepreneurs use loans as 
small as $100 to grow thriving businesses and, in turn, provide [for] their families, 
leading to strong and flourishing local economies” (International Year of Microcredit 
2005). The published report from the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign claims 
“microcredit is one of the most powerful tools to address global poverty” (Daley-Harris 
2006). Yunus has continually championed the revolutionary promise of microfinance to 
reduce poverty and famously stated he will create a “poverty museum” after the condition 
is eradicated (Yunus 2007 and 2010). These types of narratives produced and consumed 
through the microfinance discourse create hyperinflated expectations about 
microfinance’s potential and its impact. 
Underneath microfinance’s numerous anecdotal success stories and claims to 
poverty reduction lay privileged rationalities or ways of knowing. The microfinance 
discourse feeds on and reproduces values of individualism, entrepreneurialism, and self-
help, and underlying assumptions about poverty, markets, and economic development. 
Microcredit represents a major shift in development rationality—from a view that the 
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state is responsible for providing financial capital and economic opportunity to the poor 
and marginalized to one in which credit delivery is best placed in the hands of local 
specialized private institutions, and rational individuals are responsible for securing their 
own economic welfare (Bateman 2010; Rankin 2001; Rankin and Shakya 2007). In this 
understanding, the poor individual is the central actor and responsible party in the 
solution to the problem of poverty. Moreover, the individual’s successful participation in 
the market, and the eventual accumulation of wealth, are held as the primary indicators 
for overall economic development. Microfinance emphasizes individual entrepreneurship 
in the private market as the means to poverty reduction, wealth accumulation, and 
economic development over all other possible forms, such as state-led development, 
welfare spending, wealth redistribution, or cooperative models (Ellerman 2007; Bateman 
2010). Within this limited individualistic view of poverty and development, greater 
structural causes of poverty and structural change are essentially ignored.  
Microfinance functions within a certain set of economic institutions and 
structures. Specifically, microfinance emerged to become the favored development 
intervention as neoliberal capitalism solidifies its position as the globally dominant 
political economic system. Rankin and Shakya (2007) argue that the basic tenets of 
neoliberalism—particularly the idea that markets are the best mechanism to achieve 
growth and efficiency—are reflected within microfinance. Mainstream microfinance is 
grounded in the ideas of participation in markets, minimalist states and deregulated 
institutions, and the self-reliance and resilience of individual households. To understand 
how these connections play out through microfinance and on the ground, Rankin and 
Shakya (2007) insist that neoliberalism must be treated as a hegemonic process by which 
legitimacy is expressed within prevailing political and cultural discourses, both in global 
terms and within the policies, institutions, and social structures of national contexts. 
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Rankin rejects the representation of neoliberalism as “the natural and inevitable outcome 
of unleashed market forces” (2001:22). Instead, neoliberalism and its related projects 
become the established system of rule through contested processes in national political 
and moral domains. It is through this hegemonic process that states legitimate the liberal 
market rationale among their citizens and create systems and policies to ensure its 
functioning.   
Weber (2002 and 2004) argues that microcredit has been “strategically 
embedded” in the global political economy as a means to legitimate and facilitate global 
neoliberal restructuring. The World Bank has played a major role in facilitating the 
“enabling environment” for financial liberalization and adjustment, and has done so via 
microcredit and its poverty reduction agenda. Weber suggests that it became clear that the 
Washington Consensus’s structural adjustments were limited in their promise for social 
justice, and there was an increasing potential for resistance to political reforms. Thus the 
post-Washington Consensus then “was challenged to respond to calls for ‘adjustment 
with a human face’” (Weber 2002:538). In this context, the World Bank developed a 
distinct poverty agenda, targeting NGOs, poverty programs, women’s programs, and 
microenterprises, and tying debt relief programs with the implementation of targeted 
poverty programs. Through this process, Weber argues, microcredit was repositioned as a 
poverty alleviation component of structural reform (Weber 2002). As a product of this 
agenda, in the mid-1990s, the World Bank formed CGAP, a multi-donor initiative with 
the mandate to facilitate an environment that enabled microcredit. Weber explains that 
CGAP coordinates with the World Bank to achieve regional and country-level 
commitments for financial liberalization. 
The political and social power of microcredit relies on its production of particular 
forms of subjectivity (Rankin 2001). The “subjects” of the development intervention 
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(microcredit) are no longer beneficiaries with social rights to welfare, but rather rational 
clients with responsibilities to themselves, their families, and the community. The 
ideology of microcredit espouses a social identity—the hard-working, self-reliant, profit-
maximizing entrepreneur. The individual client is responsible for smartly investing his or 
her loan in a way to seek profit, enhance the family’s income and standard of living, and 
ensure successful repayment. The client is constructed as the principal agent in the 
family’s escape from poverty as well as an ally of local economic development. His or 
her repayment of a loan plus interest contributes to the ongoing sustainability of the 
lending institution and therefore the economic opportunity and welfare of himself and the 
entire community. Here, the burden for development and poverty alleviation falls on the 
shoulders of the poor and disadvantaged (Bateman 2010; Rankin 2001). Not only are the 
poor expected to work their way out of their own personal situation of poverty, they are 
increasingly expected to pay the full costs of their exit (Bateman 2010).  
Rankin (2001) argues that this subject identity shaped by the microfinance 
discourse functions as a means to legitimate the market rationale and restructure the 
relationship of individual citizens to the state. In one interpretation, microcredit is a form 
of subjugation as it attempts to create individual subject-clients that fall in line with the 
prevailing political and economic rationalities (Rankin 2001). The subjects are thus 
understood as pawns in a larger, and perhaps a sinister, neoliberal project, and individuals 
are stripped of their potential to act as agents who contest and resist these subjectivities.  
Bateman (2010) and Weber (2004) suggest that the promotion of microcredit as a 
social remedy to poverty has functioned in a way that deflects citizens’ demands on the 
state and dampens any resistance or challenges to the ruling social order. Bateman writes 
that “(m)icrofinance delegitimizes and helps dismantle all possible ‘bottoms-up’ attempts 
to propose alternative development policies that might be of direct benefit to the 
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majority” (2010:161). For Bateman, microfinance serves as a means to “contain” the 
poor. Though the microfinance discourse, Bateman suggests, the poor frame their exit 
from poverty through their personal interaction with the market, not through social 
movements, organization in union, or political pressure for more radical remedies such as 
land reform or wealth redistribution. Similarly, Weber (2004) argues that microfinance 
serves a political safety net by creating opportunities to empower the poor by engaging 
them in micro-entrepreneurial activities. The motivation, she argues, “is to use 
microcredit intervention as a means to pre-emptively counter social protest or political 
dissent by using credit to off-set income insecurity…” (Weber 2004:362). 
These scholars seem to describe a situation in which the microfinance discourse 
has created a reality where the subjects (the borrowers) do not and are not able to resist. 
This interpretation, however, ignores the documented ways that clients have challenged 
and undermined microcredit goals; the ways local cultural politics interact with and 
contest microcredit rhetoric and ideology; and the ways that microcredit has led to social 
change in surprising and unintended outcomes (for example, Kabeer 1994; Sen 1990; 
Rahman 1999). The problem with this perspective is that it constructs microfinance 
clients as objects of microfinance and ignores the possibility of client agency. As I 
explore in the subsequent chapters, microfinance clients in Nicaragua are actively 
resisting the prevailing microfinance discourse, creating new narratives and 
subjectivities, and opening up a new space of public debate. In the conclusion, I reflect on 
the significance of their resistance for microfinance in Nicaragua and in general. 
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Chapter 3: History of Economic Development in Nicaragua up to the 
Age of Microfinance 
 
Microcredit as a development intervention has a relatively recent history in 
Nicaragua. Microfinance emerged in the early 1990s as the country underwent a jarring 
shift from a development approach in which the revolutionary nation-state assumed the 
responsibility for socioeconomic welfare to one in which that responsibility is placed in 
the capitalist market. This particular history, marked by the implementation of structural 
adjustment political and economic reforms, created new ideological and structural spaces 
where microfinance, as a private non-governmental effort to serve financially excluded 
microentrepreneurs and the rural poor, took hold. 
 
REVOLUTIONARY SANDINISTAS AND CREDIT, “SANDINISTA-STYLE” 
When the Sandinista revolutionaries ousted the brutal, four-decade-long Somoza 
family dictatorship in 1979, they inherited an economy devastated by corruption, war, 
and a highly inequitable economic structure. On the heels of the revolution, the 
Sandinista leadership attempted to break with the exploitative, socially regressive agro-
export economic model fostered by the Somoza dictatorship and instead establish a state-
led redistributive economy (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006; Babb 1995). The Sandinista 
government seized and redistributed the estates of the Somozas and their friends, 
nationalized select private industries, established social services and labor policies to 
support the poor, and distributed resources to the country’s small-scale, low-wealth 
producers (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006).  
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The seized lands were transformed into state-run farms and rented to state-
sponsored peasant cooperatives, or in some cases, lands were granted a few individuals 
for small-scale production (Colburn 1986). As a critical part of the restructuring of the 
national economy, the Sandinistas moved quickly to restore and stimulate the agricultural 
sector—the backbone of the Nicaraguan economy—and revive domestic and export 
production. The government bought and sold products from rural small-scale producers, 
underwrote some costs of production supplies, and established import controls and tariffs 
to protect domestic markets (Colburn 1986). In the first four years of the revolutionary 
state, agricultural production experienced a growth in output and returned to pre-
revolutionary levels (Colburn 1986).  
Babb (1995) describes how the Sandinista government reorganized work and 
labor in the urban centers and the countryside. The government encouraged formal 
employment, created thousands of formal wage positions, and attracted workers to the 
expanding state sector in the cities and on state farms. Workers in small-scale activities 
and the informal sector were encouraged to organize in collectives, and through the 
cooperatives, the state provided access to training programs, credit, and low-cost 
products, and bought and sold the products they produced (Babb 1995). The labor 
reforms were established to address the problems of unemployment and 
underemployment, to protect workers and maintain wages, and to encourage small-scale 
productive activities.  
The new government nationalized private industries and brought them under state 
control. The Sandinista leadership nationalized private domestic banks, which, during the 
Somoza era, had developed in a mutually beneficial relationship with the agro-export 
industry and landed elite and concentrated resources among the wealthiest large-scale 
producers. The traditional private banking system historically excluded small-scale, rural 
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producers and small-scale businesses. The Sandinistas consolidated the financial system 
under the national bank, and its development operations, BANADES, offered small-scale 
rural producers access to state credit programs. Sandinista economists referred to 1980 as 
the year of the piñata, as the state generously scattered credit around the countryside and 
into the hands of the rural poor: new bank branches opened in rural towns and mobile 
banks delivered credit resources to more remote areas (Enriquez and Spalding 1987). The 
national banking system was reorganized under efforts to undo the concentration of 
resources at the top and make them available to those who had been excluded by the 
traditional financial system. For the first time, formal credit was available to thousands of 
rural producers. 
The government encouraged the organization of rural producers in agricultural 
cooperatives to facilitate the disbursement of credit. By loaning to cooperatives—some 
organized specifically for the solicitation of credit—BANADES could distribute financial 
resources to a larger number of producers with fewer administrative costs of managing 
many individual applications and borrowers. BANADES’ programs offered rural 
producers favorable credit, dispensed in cash, with special interest rates of 11 to 13 
percent for individual borrowers and 7 to 8 percent for cooperatives (standard interest 
rates for larger producers were 17 percent) with minimal, if any, collateral (Jonakin and 
Enriquez 1999). The number of rural producers receiving credit nearly quadrupled from 
28,000 at its pre-revolutionary peak in 1978 to 100,000 in 1980, and the amount of credit 
directed toward small-scale producers increased by 600 percent (Colburn 1986). 
However, the Sandinista government’s rural credit programs ran into several 
problems. In keeping lending interest rates low for borrowers, real interest rates (taking 
inflation into account) were low and often negative and undermined savings deposits. 
Over-generous credit delivery (possibly exceeding producer need), the state control of 
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food prices to support urban populations, and the spread of the Contra war complicated 
small producers’ abilities to repay (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). In 1980, the repayment 
rate was 26 percent and that figure only rose to 50 to 60 percent by the mid-1980s. In 
1982, the government contracted its program and reduced the number of loans it made to 
the rural production sector. The following two years, the government enacted selective 
debt pardoning targeted to small producers of basic food crops and assumed the debts of 
the state farms. With low recovery rates and rising inflation discouraging savings 
deposits, BANADES operated at a loss and relied on the government to underwrite its 
low-interest loans (Enriquez and Spalding 1987; Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). 
Nonetheless, throughout the decade, the state served as the primary provider of low-
interest credit for rural producers. 
 
THE TRANSITION TO A CAPITALIST MODEL AND CREDIT, “NEOLIBERAL STYLE” 
Enduring national economic hardship, the U.S.-backed Contra war, and economic 
embargo, the Sandinistas struggled to control the downward economic spiral and its 
effects on the population. At the end of the decade, Nicaraguans went to the polls and 
replaced the Sandinista government. The National Opposition Union (UNO) party, 
headed by Violeta Chamorro, quickly embraced the mandates of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and, with the help of USAID, initiated the process of structural 
adjustment and austere economic and social reforms. The transition from socialist-
oriented models to capitalist, market-driven models was not simple, but rather, as Babb 
(1995) suggests, “negotiated processes that often allowed for unexpected economic 
juxtapositions.” In fact, market liberalization and adjustment measures were undertaken 
by the Sandinista regime in 1988 to control hyperinflation, and into the early 1990s, the 
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state also played a role, though now much more limited, in regulating markets. 
Nonetheless, since the adoption of a neoliberal agenda, the Nicaraguan government has 
overseen a “systematic undoing” of the economic reforms implemented by the 
Sandinistas (Babb 1995).  
The neoliberal adjustment required steep cuts to government spending, the 
dismantling of the state sector and reestablishment of private industry, and the institution 
of policies that favored an open market and profit-led economy. As historian Walker 
(1997) argues, “All these, it was believed, would eliminate inflation, increase 
productivity, stimulate international trade, and result in economic growth. Although 
many people would be dislocated and suffer in the short run, long-term economic growth 
would eventually be to the benefit of all.” The government’s support of a market-led, 
competitive structure favored foreign investment and large-scale producers and industries 
to the detriment of the country’s poor.  
In an effort to stimulate the economy, the Chamorro administration removed 
poor-protective policies and aggressively redirected policies and resources to support an 
agro-industrial export and open import economic strategy. In the competitive market, 
high-wealth, large-scale businesses, both national and international and new, cheap 
imported goods effectively drove smaller industries out of business. Small-scale 
producers and cooperatives, no longer assisted by the state, failed at increasing rates 
(Babb 1995). Unable to access resources and compete in the new market, small producers 
sold their lands or simply abandoned rural production and entered the wage and informal 
markets for employment (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999; Babb 1995). Jonakin and Enriquez 
(1999) illustrate the trend throughout the early and mid-1990s in which small-scale 
farmers sold land, often at distress sale rates below market value, to mostly wealthy, 
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large-scale producers, resulting in increasingly concentrated and unequal distribution of 
land.  
Economic and labor reforms also had detrimental effects on smaller-scale 
businesses. Barricada Internacional reported on a CONAPI study that showed around 
7,000 small and medium-sized industries and services closed in 1992, which left just 
some 3,000 shops registered with the Ministry of the Economy (Babb 1995). Babb (1995) 
examines the political, economic, and discursive shift to marginalize cooperatives 
promoted by the Sandinistas and to endorse microenterprises as emblematic of the free 
markets in the context of the early 1990s neoliberal agenda. The newly established Office 
of Small Industries and Microenterprises under the Ministry of the Economy, along with 
a handful of NGOs, provided loans and technical assistance to promote microenterprise 
development, and the National Program to Support Microenterprise carried out publicity 
campaigns and organized fairs to promote the sale of microenterprise products and goods. 
However, as Babb found in interviews with program directors, many of the supported 
microenterprises had gone out of business and were unable to repay their loans. The 
small businesses had little chance of success in an economic climate that favored cheap 
imported goods and competition. As Babb concludes, “(T)he new administrative 
apparatus and discourse around microenterprises seems designed to offer hope to the 
most vulnerable economic sector at the same time that neoliberal policies further 
undermine the chance of success of that sector” (Babb 1995:6). 
Cuts in the state sector meant the loss of thousands of formal wage jobs: the 
“Occupational Conversion” program, funded by USAID, oversaw the removal of 28,000 
state jobs in 1991 (Babb 1995). The government opened “free trade” zones near urban 
centers and international companies offered some low-wage employment. As small-scale 
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producers left their lands, small-scale industries failed, and former state employees exited 
their jobs, the informal sector in urban and rural areas swelled.  
The newly reestablished private commercial banking system was proposed as the 
means to counter the withdrawal of the state and its perceived inefficiency and failures in 
financial markets. The IMF agreements signed in 1991 required the Central Bank and 
newly established private financial institutions to conform to financial “efficiency 
criteria” (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006). Interest rates would be determined by the 
market rather than the state, and would reflect costs plus premiums for administration, 
risk, and inflation. Bank authorities instituted policies that tightened controls and 
restrictions on lending and required greater security and full repayment of prior loans 
before additional credit would be released. Commercial banks avoided lending small 
loans to poor borrowers with limited value collateral and vulnerability to economic 
shocks due to the assumed risks and to the additional administrative and delivery costs of 
small individual loans. Tightened loan requirements meant that many borrowers, 
especially those without collateral, were excluded from private bank credit. As loan 
interest rates had doubled from what they were in the 1980s, many clients were priced out 
of the market. Commercial bank credit became markedly concentrated: 72 percent of 
private bank credit resources were disbursed among 6 percent of their clients—just 880 
individuals—who received larger loans of C$250,000 or more (Jonakin and Enriquez 
1999). The total loan portfolio of private banking system directed to agriculture and 
livestock was just 26 percent, and most credit was concentrated in commercial, industrial, 
or personal credit. Moreover, any severely limited lending to the rural production sector 
in the 1990s was undermined by the larger economic policies that supported large-scale 
business, facilitated mass agricultural export, and opened the domestic economy to the 
“free” market competition of foreign exchange (Babb 1995). As Jonakin and Enriquez 
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(1999) suggest, the reconstitution of the private financial markets only renewed the 
problem of systematic market failures and exclusion of the rural and small-scale 
production sectors.  
Under neoliberal economic reform, the eventual dismemberment of state credit 
programs left small-scale producers without access to credit. Immediate cuts in spending 
at the Banco Central meant sharp retraction in BANADES and Banco de Crédito Popular 
credit programs. Restrictions on the disbursal of credit to those defaulted, the 
establishment of market interest rates (at 30 percent for BANADES in 1994), and the 
closure of rural branches effectively excluded many rural producers and poor borrowers. 
After 1991, the area (manzana) financed and agricultural credit disbursed dropped by 50 
percent for the 1992 harvest cycle and continued an overall downward trend until 1998 
(Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). Significantly, several strong indicators show a reversal of 
the trend of credit for the country’s low-wealth, small-scale producers and illustrate a 
concentration in credit available to fewer wealthy borrowers. Crops for domestic 
consumption—beans and corn—faced the greatest cuts in credit as compared to crops for 
export. The share of BANADES financing for large-scale producers rose from 31 percent 
to 71 percent, and the number of client-borrowers decreased from an average of 80,000 in 
the 1980s to just 13,580 in 1992. In 1993, a report by the Superintendency noted that 124 
BANADES clients held loans over an average C$2.5 million (Jonakin and Enriquez 
1999). Though in 1993 the IMF and World Bank rhetorically encouraged BANADES to 
redirect its lending priorities to rural producers, the economic reforms undermined 
BANADES’s ability to do so (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). In 1994, under new IMF 
agreements, BANADES credit was cut further. By 1996, 14,000 producers defaulted on 
BANADES loans and faced foreclosures on the lands (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999).  
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At the end of the decade, under pressure from the World Bank and IMF and the 
new reform agreements, the Nicaraguan government ceded to neoliberal rationality and 
closed BANADES. In its place, though, the National Assembly created the Fund for 
Rural Credit to act as an intermediary, receiving funds from the Nicaragua Investment 
Finance Corporation (FNI) and loans from external bi- and multilateral organizations and 
disbursing loans to financial institutions, banks, and MFIs (Ley 294, 1998). The 
government also began the private sale of its shares of the Banco de Crédito Popular, and 
the state-led institution was eventually dismantled.  
The state was eventually removed as a provider of credit. Rather, in its new form, 
the state served as a gateway to funnel external loans from international development 
agencies and development banks into the country’s expanding private microcredit sector. 
As the first decade of structural adjustment and reforms closed, Nicaragua was one of the 
poorest and most aid-dependent countries in Latin America. In the early 1990s, GDP 
growth was negative or flat, and only increased slightly in the mid-1990s. The overall 
economic growth was particularly sensitive and vulnerable to global price changes in 
commodities, especially coffee. Overall poverty in Nicaragua in the 1990s remained 
around 50 percent and extreme poverty averaged 18 percent, but rural poverty was at 68 
percent and 29 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2003). With the growth in population, there 
were 180,000 more people in poverty by 1998 (World Bank 2003). Unemployment was 
high: official rates were reported to be around 25 percent, but independent reports suggest 
unemployment was as high as 60 percent in 1995 (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999; Babb 
1995). Social indicators—health, nutrition, education, literacy—and basic 
infrastructure—clean water, sanitation, electricity, and housing—were at best stagnant 
throughout the decade (World Bank 2003). The economic and social problems were 
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exacerbated and put in sharp relief in 1998 in the wake of the destruction of Hurricane 
Mitch, one of the worst natural disasters in the country’s history.  
Ultimately, increased competition driven by the market-oriented approach to 
development, along with the sudden lack of access to credit and protective policies, 
pushed the poor to abandon small businesses, sell properties, and move into low-wage 
labor and informal activities. Wealth, land, and resources were increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of the wealthy and powerful. The political-economic transformation 
prioritized private, liberal markets as a means to economic stability and development. 
Under these transitions, the foundation was laid for the emergence of microfinance in 
Nicaragua, which I review in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Modern Microfinance in Nicaragua 
 
In the early 1990s, following changes in the economic structure resulting from 
structural adjustment reforms, a number of NGOs emerged with non-traditional financial 
programs and the vision of reaching low-wealth borrowers excluded from traditional 
commercial credit and abandoned by the withdrawal of the state credit.5 The evolution of 
these microcredit programs and institutions took place as the state delegated the 
responsibility for development and poverty alleviation to the private sector and individual 
actors. Over the next two decades, these NGO microlending programs have come to play 
the most significant role in the provision of small-scale credit to Nicaragua’s rural 
producers, small businesses, and urban poor.  
In the first three years of the neoliberal agenda, many micro lending programs 
were created through well-established international microfinance agencies (such as 
                                                
5 It is important to note that non-state “micro” loans to rural farmers and small businesses did not begin in 
Nicaragua only after the transition to a neoliberal model. Prior to 1979, a small non-traditional credit 
market provided savings and credit services to small- and medium-scale producers and retail businesses in 
Nicaragua. Credit and Savings Cooperatives (CACs), under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor, 
operated as rotating credit and savings associations with member savings acting as the source of funds for 
loans to its members (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). While the CACs and other sources of informal credit 
were the primary credit resources for poorer borrowers before the 1980s, the abundant supply of credit 
under Sandinista credit programs and high inflation rates drastically undermined the financial role of CACs 
in the 1980s.  
Cooperatives (credit union-like institutions) also played a role in the new credit markets that 
opened after 1990. Generally, these member-owned institutions, regulated by the Ministry of Industry and 
Labor, legally accept member savings deposits and make small loans to its members. CACs are relatively 
small in size (client numbers) and manage smaller total loan portfolios. By 2002, there were 180 credit and 
savings cooperatives in Nicaragua each with an average of 331 clients and an average loan portfolio of 
US$156,000.  
The structure, function, and regulatory status of CACs are different from unregulated and 
regulated microcredit institutions. Some CACs utilize techniques common to other microcredit institutions 
and encounter the same challenges. For the purposes of this thesis, most CACs, specifically those not 
affiliated with the professional association of microcredit institutions (discussed below), are not included as 
MFIs. Two CACs are affiliated with the association of microcredit institutions: CEPRODEL and C. 20 de 
Abril. One other long-standing CAC, Caruna, was a part of the association of MFIs until recently. 
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ACCION International and FINCA International) or as start-up projects receiving 
funding and technical support from international development NGOs (including Catholic 
Relief Services, Caritas, World Vision International, and Mennonite Economic 
Development Associates). Alongside these internationally affiliated programs, local 
development organizations initiated microcredit projects as a part of their services, and a 
number of local independent microcredit-specific programs also appeared. These 
programs either functioned as an arm of legal non-profit NGOs or, in the case of stand-
alone microcredit programs, were soon incorporated as non-profit institutions under the 
law.  
In December 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sent 
ACCION International, one of the largest and oldest microfinance agencies in Latin 
America supported by USAID, to Nicaragua to “assess the financial needs of Nicaragua’s 
microentrepreneurs” (ACCION 2011). With the technical and financial help of ACCION, 
the Austrian government, and the Inter-American Development Bank, a group of 
Nicaraguan private businessmen established the non-profit Fundación para el Apoyo a la 
Microempresa (FAMA) with the goal to resolve the serious problem of unemployment 
and the lack of resources for those who cannot access bank credit. FAMA’s vision was to 
provide their clients with credit opportunities to help their families and communities get 
ahead through their own hard work and efforts. The non-profit institution began loaning 
in 1992 in the communities of Masaya and Chinandega.  
A 1994 report by NITLAPAN research institution demonstrates the distribution of 
rural finance by producer class and finance source (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). The 
NGO microcredit sector served 23,226 individuals with total credit at US$3.4 million. 
While the new sector served double the number of small-scale producer clients that 
BANADES served that year, the average NGO loan was US$146 compared to the 
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average US$2,312 BANADES offered. Together, the number of small-scale clients 
served by BANADES and NGOs was nearly half the number provided on average with 
credit in the 1980s.  
The efforts, though, lacked cohesion, cooperation, and a long-term vision for the 
sector’s development (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999; van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 
2004). Changing goals and limited resources from external funders in the international 
donor community affected the potential of microcredit programs. In 1999, a number of 
early MFIs united and formed La Asociación Nicaragüense de Instituciones de 
Microfinanzas (the Nicaraguan Association of Microfinance Institutions), ASOMIF, to 
represent and support the interests of its member institutions and the national 
microfinance industry. The objectives of ASOMIF have been to promote and strengthen 
the institutions of its affiliates in order to foster the development of the micro and small 
business sectors in urban and rural Nicaragua. ASOMIF represents its affiliates and the 
microfinance sector in relevant debates and legal subjects at the national and international 
levels.  
Bilateral donors, multilateral development agencies, international financial 
institutions, and private first-world foundations and investors provided the key start-up 
funds and support for the initiation of the country’s first microcredit programs and 
institutions in the 1990s. As van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders (2004) and Flaming et al. 
(2005) argue, the microcredit sector in Nicaragua emerged and expanded largely from the 
major role of international development donors and agencies. External institutions and 
organizations created and encouraged the creation of a number of MFIs with the goal of 
providing credit for poor households and microentrepreneurs.  
The Nicaraguan government has played an active, facilitating role in channeling 
foreign aid resources to the emerging microcredit sector. In 1993, the government of 
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Norway granted US$4 million to the Nicaraguan government for the creation of El 
Programa Nacional de Apoyo a la Microempresa (PAMIC), a national program to 
support microenterprise. PAMIC (today known as INPYME) channeled the foreign credit 
funds to rural producers through financial intermediaries. Fourteen NGO microcredit 
institutions informally made up the PAMIC network6 (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 
2004). In 1996, the primary donor to PAMIC, then the Netherlands, pulled out to be 
replaced by the UNDP and the countries of Scandinavia and Switzerland, which created 
programs to continue to develop the microfinance sector in the country (van Dijck, 
Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). 
In a 2000 summary of the microfinance sector, Findley identifies the major 
sources of funds in the private microcredit industry: 1) loans and credit lines from 
international governments (the German Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 
GTZ), international and regional development banks (IADB and Banco Central de 
Integración Económica), and private investment funds and institutions (NICA Fund); 2) 
technical assistance support and donations from international organizations 
(Interamerican Foundation and international affiliates); and 3) donations and loans from 
bilateral government donors and multilateral development agencies (USAID). The flow 
of international monies in Nicaragua forms a complicated map that begins from bilateral 
and multilateral development groups and development investors that lend monies and 
donate funds to a series of second-tier institutions (including El Fondo de Crédito Rural 
and others) and private banks (Financiera Nicaragüense de Inversiones, FNI, and Banco 
Centroamericano de Integración Económica, BCIE, for example) that in turn disburse 
                                                
6 Including six MFIs later affiliated with ASOMIF: ASODERI, CEPRODEL, Fundacion Nieborowski, 
Fundacion Leon 2000, FUDESI, and ACODEP (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). Many other 
early microcredit programs fell outside the scope of PAMIC. 
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loans and technical assistance to hundreds of microcredit institutions (Flaming et al. 
2005).  
CGAP’s 2005 report on effectiveness and accountability in Nicaragua’s 
microcredit sector suggests “too many donor agencies are channeling too much money 
through too many channels, with a surfeit of expectations about what credit can achieve 
for the poor” (Flaming et al 2005:6). In 2005, some 23 bi- and multi-lateral donor 
agencies and 5 private investors funded microcredit in Nicaragua. CGAP found that the 
incoherent overfunding fragmented the sector and at times produced competing efforts 
and duplicate programs. Moreover, the double, sometimes triple, lending involved in the 
flow of funds through second-tier institutions complicates funding requirements and, with 
add-on fees at each level, even raises costs to the end borrower. 
 
THE SUSTAINABILITY DEBATE ENTERS NICARAGUA’S MICROFINANCE SECTOR 
Microcredit first developed in Nicaragua when pressures for institutional financial 
sustainability and efficiency had not quite become the priority in the global microfinance 
industry (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). Many small early NGOs worked with 
the goal to provide credit to entrepreneurs and producers excluded from the commercial 
credit market. By the end of the decade, efficiency and operational sustainability were the 
new rule (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). MFIs were judged in terms of their 
efficiency (administrative costs to portfolio) and level of subsidization (amount of 
external grants and subsidized loans received). But most MFIs did not live up to the 
efficiency and sustainability standards. Nicaragua’s microfinance sector is characterized 
by a high level of external subsidization and dependency on foreign aid and investment. 
The World Bank found Nicaragua’s institutions to be weak, highly inefficient, and 
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undermined by high interest rates and overfunding (World Bank 2003). Van Dijck, 
Nusselder, and Sanders (2004) reported that one study showed that a group of 7 MFIs 
received an average of 60 percent of their total loan portfolio in external interest-bearing 
loans. Moreover, they estimated that only 10 percent of specialized MFIs might be able to 
generate enough independent revenue to be sustainable.  
With mounting pressures from external funding sources to conform to best 
practices to ensure financial viability, several microcredit organizations committed to 
introduce mechanisms and practices to reduce their lending risks and ensure their long-
term viability (Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). Nicaragua’s early microcredit programs 
quickly adjusted their practices that would match global microfinance industry strategies 
and traditional banking practices to recuperate loan monies. For borrowers with sufficient 
property and assets, MFIs would now require standard collateral, which could include 
farm animals, household appliances, the harvest or a property title (Jonakin and Enriquez 
1999). For those borrowers without collateral, a few organizations developed group 
lending and joint liability models (though these group models were often not the primary 
loan methodology) (Findley 2000). These organizations also opened local branches in 
target communities and rural areas and employed local personnel to improve the 
organization’s access to information on clients, their businesses, and their ability to repay 
(Jonakin and Enriquez 1999). Interest rates on loans were modeled to reflect market 
conditions. By the latter half of the 1990s, interest rates reportedly averaged between 23.4 
percent—almost 10 points higher than the average among the other Central American 
countries (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). Organizations began to “diversify” 
their lending portfolios by including various economic sectors in their credit programs; in 
other words, some programs included non-poor clients and medium-sized, established 
businesses in their client base. Recovery rates improved and provided more stable funds 
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for the growing microcredit programs. Regardless of improved recovery, most 
microcredit organizations chronically relied (and generally still rely) on external funding 
sources to cover operating expenses and expand microcredit programs.  
The legal status of microcredit institutions in Nicaragua prohibits them from 
collecting operating capital from other potential sources. With the legal status of non-
governmental organization—the status all but two7 of Nicaragua’s MFIs hold today—the 
institutions do not fall under state supervision by the Superintendency of Banks. 
Although the MFIs may grant and manage loans, these organizations are restricted from 
accepting savings deposits or providing other financial services, such as insurance and 
remittance payouts. The NGOs have the ability to transform into regulated commercial 
institutions, which in turn are have the legal right to hold savings deposits from the 
public. However, many MFIs cannot afford the costly process and portfolio minimums to 
bring the institutions under the regulation of the Superintendency. Donor agencies have 
continued to grant subsidized loans to fund MFIs and, except in a couple of cases, have 
not provided the capital and technical assistance to undergo transformation into regulated 
institutions. Moreover, as regulated financial institutions, the MFIs would be subject to 
requirements more in line with formal banking and have to tighten the structure of loans, 
leading to the exclusion of the target population the MFIs intend to serve. 
 
THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT RESTRAINS MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES 
In 2000, the Central Bank published a notice in La Prensa that interest rates in the 
national financial system had reached over 79 percent (Astacio 2000). Law 176, 
established in 1994, regulated the interest rates on loans between individual entities—in 
                                                
7 The two regulated MFIs are Banco Procrédit and FAMA. The third institution to achieve regulated status, 
Banex, was liquidated in 2010.  
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this case, the legal definition includes MFIs—to no more than 50 percent more than those 
charged in the private banks (Ley 176, 1994; Blanco 2000). This meant that MFIs could 
legally charge up to 120 percent annual, or 10 percent monthly, interest rates to its 
clients.  
In response to the concerns of interest rate abuses, in 2001 the Nicaraguan 
National Assembly approved Law 374, “Regulating Loans between Private Individuals,” 
which set a maximum interest rate for loans between private individuals to the average 
variable rates charged by the country’s commercial banks—on average less than 18 
percent (Ley 374, 2001; Sandoval 2000). Some lawmakers hoped the regulation would 
cap potentially excessive interest rates and provide equal, or at least better, terms of loans 
for microcredit borrowers (Corea 2001). In practice, the law has not been consistently 
enforced and may, in fact, have made MFIs less transparent in their activities (Flaming et 
al. 2005). Despite the law, MFIs continue to provide loans with market-based interest 
rates with additional default rates and fees to clients (Nuñez, Guerrero, and Bravo 2005; 
Flaming et al. 2005). In 2004, MFI’s self-reported annual interest rates on average varied 
between 18 and 24 percent for the agricultural sector and 30 to 36 percent for the 
commercial sector, but rates could reach 60 percent (Moncada 2004).  
The microcredit sector rallied against Law 374 and the idea of a government-
imposed fixed interest rate. A capped rate, microcredit leaders argued, was not reflective 
of the supply and demand of credit in the market, and the rate would not cover the costs 
of delivering credit to MFI borrowers (Corea 2001). ASOMIF presented several 
proposals to the National Assembly to establish an official special regulatory framework 
for the growing microfinance sector to ensure its long-term stability and integration. 
ASOMIF’s proposal would apply the banking law to establish interest rates and allow 
lenders to “freely agree upon interest rates,” disqualifying Law 374 (van Dijck, 
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Nusselder, and Sanders 2004). The proposed legislation would bring the microcredit 
industry under the supervision of a new committee consisting of members from the 
Superintendency, the Ministry of Industry, and a representative from ASOMIF. 
Regulations would be compulsory and institutions would be subject to audit and rules of 
transparency. Most importantly, as regulated but still non-profit institutions, under the 
law proposed by the microfinance sector, MFIs would be allowed to accept savings 
deposits from clients. Then president of ASOMIF, Armando Garcia, argued that the law 
was necessary for microcredit lenders to expand their coverage and help more persons to 
rise out of poverty (López 2004). The proposed law, however, stalled in the National 
Assembly. Though finally approved in principle in 2004, special committees eventually 
rejected the law. In midst of debate, the Assembly clearly signaled that it would not 
approve the capture of savings deposits for non-bank entities (Nuñez, Guerrero, and 
Bravo 2005). 
 
THE STATE OF THE MICROCREDIT SECTOR AFTER THE FIRST DECADE  
The microcredit industry in Nicaragua grew dramatically in the first decade. From 
1997 to 2001, loan portfolios managed by the country’s microcredit programs grew 
annually by an average 47 percent (Lacayo 2002). In 2001, the 16 MFIs associated with 
ASOMIF had 123 urban and rural branches in the country.8 According to ASOMIF data 
reported in 2001, the MFIs reported 128,589 clients with an average loan size of US$468 
and a total loan portfolio of over US$51.5 million. The average loan default rate was 5.6 
                                                
8 The 16 MFIs that made up ASOMIF at the end of 2001 were the following institutions (in order of largest 
loan portfolio December 2001): FDL, ACODEP, FAMA, CEPRODEL, CARUNA, PRODESA, Fundacion 
JOSE NIEBOROWISKI, PRESTANIC, FINCA Nicaragua, FIDESA (later BANEX), Fundenuse, 
ASODERI, Fundacion León 2000, Fundacion 4i – 2000, PROMUJER, and FODEM. 
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percent. Unregulated NGO MFIs managed about 60 percent of microcredit resources and 
served 73 percent of borrowers (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders 2004).  
A majority of the loan monies were distributed for agriculture and livestock (35.1 
percent of the total loan portfolios) and commerce (37.9 percent). Most of the ASOMIF 
institutions made loans for agriculture and livestock activities (13 of the 16 surveyed by 
Findley [2000]), with some institutions dedicating as much as 90 percent of credit to the 
agricultural sector. In comparison with the microcredit markets in Honduras, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador, Findley (2000) finds that agricultural credit was a significant part of 
microcredit programs in Nicaragua, and microcredit for agriculture was insignificant or 
non-existent in the three other Central American countries. All MFIs also made loans for 
commercial business purposes. Less than half of the institutions made housing and 
consumption loans, which totaled 2.4 and 7.3 percent of the total microfinance loan 
portfolio, respectively.  
In a survey of 26 MFIs in Nicaragua, Findley (2000) found that individual lending 
was utilized much more than group lending. Almost all institutions primarily lent to 
individuals, and a few also lent to groups of borrowers. In Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador, group lending was the predominant loan methodology used by MFIs. Zamor, 
Morin, and Aviles, in a 2002 study of five microcredit institutions, reported that all 
institutions used individual loan methodology and only one institution used solidarity 
groups. The authors noted that previously, three institutions had used group lending 
methods, but had since discontinued group lending for supposed problems with loan 
recuperation. Loans were mostly short-term in length. Over 60 percent of credit was 
distributed in loans with repayment schedules of one year or less, and just 14 percent 
were in the forms of loans with two years or longer repayment schedules.  
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Effective annual interest rates on microcredit loans reached as high as 94 percent 
for commerce and 37 percent for agriculture, much higher than elsewhere in the region. 
For individual loans, microcredit institutions solicited physical material guarantees in 
order to grant loans (Zamor, Morin, and Aviles 2002). Guarantees could be tied to land 
and homes for greater loan amounts and other possessions of value for lesser amounts. In 
cases of default, microcredit institutions entered into private legal processes against their 
clients to recuperate loan monies or collateral (López and González 2000).  
Women reportedly received 49.1 percent of the total loans monies distributed by 
ASOMIF institutions, although early ASOMIF reports do not include the actual number 
of female clients. Deugd (2004) reports that women accounted for near half of all clients, 
but women represent only 38 percent of clients in rural areas; moreover, women in rural 
areas only received 17 percent of loan monies. Deugd argues that this difference can be 
attributed to a number of reasons. Traditionally, credit has been concentrated in the hands 
of male heads of household. Typically, women do no have high-value collateral or other 
resources to back loans in higher amounts. Women are also more likely to work in less-
productive activities with lower returns in the informal sector, and women have more 
demands on their time, energy, and resources as female heads of household.  
On average, Deugd continues, rural women receive loans with higher interest 
rates and shorter repayment schedules. This may be due in part to the activities in which 
women participate—more likely commercial or retail with expected higher, quicker 
returns on profit. Loans for activities such as agriculture and livestock—typically male 
dominated economic activities—may be structured with lower rates with longer 
schedules for expected lower returns over longer periods of time. Without collateral, 
women are also most often participated in group or liability lending programs when 
available.  
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After the first decade of microcredit development in Nicaragua, credit remained 
markedly concentrated in urban areas (van Dijck, Nusselder, and Sanders and 2004). 
ASOMIF data shows that Managua, the largest city, consumed 20 percent of credit 
resources. Including four other smaller cities, over half of credit was distributed in urban 
areas. Along with its urban character, microcredit was concentrated in regions with an 
average higher economic status. Most of the credit available (47.6 percent) was 
concentrated in the departments classified as “low” level of poverty. Those departments 
listed as experiencing “severe” poverty received just 9.3 percent of the loan portfolio. 
A study on the microcredit sector for the World Bank by Legovini (2003) 
revealed that only borrowers in the top 10 percentile benefited economically from 
microcredit loans. Those in the bottom 70 percentile suffered a net loss from borrowing. 
Legovini shows that the welfare conditions of poorer households in fact deteriorated 
when they borrowed and as the availability of cash loans expanded, the incidence, depth, 
and severity of poverty increased. The author concludes that in Nicaragua loans “are not 
good policy instruments for reducing poverty” (in World Bank 2003). In response to the 
Legovini study, the World Bank cautioned that microcredit in Nicaragua may not be a 
poverty-reducing instrument. The Bank identified credit as a potential strategy for the 
non-poor, but insisted microcredit may not be appropriate for the very poor.  
The microfinance sector emerged as the post-1990 Nicaraguan state rolled back 
responsibility for development to private entities. The new institutions that entered, 
backed by large amounts of external funding, provided some credit resources to 
microbusinesses in the absence of state and formal credit. As the microfinance sector 
developed in Nicaragua, certain trends appeared. Most microcredit funds were lent to 
individuals; men received a great portion of the monies available; credit was concentrated 
in urban and less-than-poor areas; and collateral requirements were common. In a 2003 
 65 
review of the microfinance sector, Legovini indicated that Nicaragua’s poor were 
unlikely to benefit economically from microcredit and the World Bank suggested that 
microcredit might only have some use for non-poor borrowers. In the next chapter, I 
present the case of protest against microfinance that dramatically appeared on the public 
scene in 2008. 
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Chapter 5: Borrower Protests: El Movimiento Del Norte 
 
No podemos esperar más. La lucha es justa.  
(We cannot wait anymore. The struggle is just.) 
 
Protest chant during a 10-day road blockade  
 
Credit like this is like a cancer. It’s the interest that kills you. 
  
Maria, small business owner participating in the protests (personal 
interview with author, July 7, 2009) 
 
In April 2008, Banco ProCrédit, a regulated microfinance institution, arranged for 
the arrest of six clients with overdue microloan debts. In response, over 400 agricultural 
producers and small business owners who had current microloans with local 
microfinance institutions parked hundreds of vehicles on the Pan American highway, the 
main corridor between Managua and Honduras, and blocked traffic for three days. “We 
cannot wait anymore, the struggle is just,” they cried as they occupied the highway. The 
demonstrators, organized as El Movimiento de Pequeños Productores, Comerciantes y 
Microempresarios del Norte, MPCN, pressured the MFIs to halt the illegal incarcerations 
and seizures of property as payment for any overdue debts. They demanded that the MFIs 
negotiate and restructure the unfair and overly burdensome terms of their loans. “We ask 
that they [the MFIs] allow us to catch our breath and let us get back to our lands and our 
businesses and produce. We want to pay our debts; we just want to pay what is fair and 
just,” expressed Jose Padilla, one of the local leaders of the organized movement 
(personal interview with author, July 7, 2009). 
Maria, the owner of a small clothing store in Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, took out a 
US$500 loan with a microfinance institution to help her buy more inventory. “I got 
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wrapped up for the necessity, to help my business, to make improvements. But it wasn’t 
enough” (personal interview with author, July 7, 2009). When sales remained flat, Maria 
could not keep up with the monthly repayment, and soon fees and penalties added up to 
more than double the principal loan. She joined in the MPCN protests in 2008. I spoke to 
Maria in 2009 in a demonstration in front of the National Assembly.  
 
So here I am. I involved myself in the movement because I had to. I had 
no choice. I could not pay and this was the only way to try to get them to 
review my loan. I cannot imagine what they would have done had I not 
joined. I know families who have made payment of their loans, but had 
nothing to feed their families. I know one family who lost their home—
can you imagine that? They [the MFIs] are leaving whole families on the 
street, without a place to go, without anything to eat. It is only fair what 
we ask for. We just want a chance to pay what is fair and manageable for 
us and not have to fear losing our homes, or having nothing to eat 
(personal interview with author, July 7, 2009). 
 
Maria’s story reflects some of the main concerns expressed by other borrowers. 
They borrowed with the intention of making a small investment, but when the results 
were not enough to support repayment, they found themselves facing default and 
increasing debts. Borrowers often used the term “drowning” to describe their experience 
struggling to make payments on their loans. Maria also points to the sacrifice that some 
borrowers make in order to satisfy repayment—in this case, that families go without 
food. Others still end up selling household goods, assets, and property for cash to make 
payments, or wait until the MFI moves in to collect on collateral.  
Eduardo, a rural rancher from Madriz, received news that a judge had issued an 
order for his arrest in 2008. He joined the protests hoping that the MFIs would drop the 
orders and renegotiate his loan.  
 
I am fleeing capture and arrest. If I go back without anything, surely the 
pressure against us and the persecution will just get worse. They charge 
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and charge and charge you interest and fees and you keep paying and 
paying. All the money you have goes to the loan, so it is like you are just 
working like a slave for the bank. Then when you cannot pay, it is even 
better for them because they take your land and your home and sell it for 
more than you owed. You lose everything. They are the only winners 
(personal interview with author, July 7, 2009). 
 
Eduardo faced mounting social and psychological pressures to repay, and when he still 
missed full payment, he received an arrest order. He saw no way out of a loan and 
compared the burden of microdebt to a life of slavery. In his perception, the borrowers 
were the “losers” in the relationship with microfinance.  
Padilla, the regional leader of the protests, owns a medium-sized ranch and 
employs a handful of workers. He had a relatively large amount of outstanding debt with 
his property as collateral. After a particularly difficult year, the beginning of the 2008 
global slowdown, Padilla found himself with low return and more debt. He approached 
the MFIs that he owed and explained his changing economic position, but the MFIs did 
not change his repayment amount or schedule. When other small landowners in the area 
were evicted from their lands, Padilla decided to organize with other individuals indebted 
to local MFIs and demand terms payable for those struggling with debt (personal 
interview with author, July 5, 2009).  
The borrowers turned to public protest to demand critical changes in the structure 
of their outstanding microloans and the nature of their relationship with the MFIs. The 
borrowers urged MFIs to lower the annual interest rates on their debts to 8 to 12 percent, 
remove all default penalties, and extend payment plans for up to 5 to 10 years. They 
charged the MFIs with practicing usury—charging extremely high interests and fees—
and exerting severe pressure on borrowers in default to make overdue payments. MFI 
workers would harass borrowers, even neighbors and family members of a borrower in 
default, in attempts to receive payment. Leaders of MFIs manipulated the judicial system 
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to enact arrest orders and hasty evictions of borrowers and their families from their 
homes and lands. The overly burdensome loans and excessive means of collection, they 
argued, meant that many borrowers would never be able to repay and may lose their 
means of survival and their home to microdebt. The borrowers of the MPCN continued 
with sporadic protests on major highways and in front of MFI branches in key towns in 
northern Nicaragua for the next few months.  
In late June, local and national political delegates and the leaders of ASOMIF met 
with the leaders of the MPCN in Managua. Over several days of heated debate, ASMOIF 
agreed to reevaluate a limited number of clients’ previous debts on a case-by-case basis 
and to extend their payments due for a few more months. The MFIs did not agree to 
lower interest rates, extend payment plans, or halt the seizure of property. They also 
refused to deal with the collective demands for renegotiation. The agreement was signed 
on July 5, 2008 by the representatives of the MPCN, ASOMIF, and FAMA, the only 
regulated MFI (of three at the time) that participated in the negotiations (Padilla 2008). 
Days after the agreements, the MPCN charged two MFIs, Banco ProCrédit and 
Fundenuse, with refusing to receive borrowers requesting renegotiation and thereby 
breaking the agreement set in Managua (Vanegas, Alvarez, and Pantoja 2008).  
During the summer of 2008, members of the MPCN continued to blockade the 
highway and demonstrate in front of MFI branches in several rural and semi-rural towns 
in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Madriz, and Estelí in northern Nicaragua. By mid-
July, the leaders of the movement claimed that they had organized 3,280 borrowers, 
ranging from small to medium-sized agricultural producers to small formal and informal 
business owners to salaried workers, and from those in default under threat of arrest or 
eviction to those who continued to make their payments but still needed restructuring of 
their loan terms with microfinance institutions. 
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During a speech in Jalapa to celebrate the upcoming 29th anniversary of the 
Sandinista revolution, President Daniel Ortega addressed the borrowers of the MPCN and 
encouraged those with outstanding debts to maintain the protest: “You have done well in 
protesting against the usurers…. Plant yourselves in front of their offices. Stay firm; we 
support you” (Vanegas and Aleman 2008). The demonstrations continued with almost 
daily protests. On July 22, as police attempted to escort staff out of Fundenuse in Ocotal, 
a group of protestors, several bearing machetes and Molotov bombs, attempted to set fire 
to the building. Anti-riot police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets against the 
crowd and several protestors and police were seriously injured (Vanegas and Aleman 
2008). Reacting to the escalating protests, several MFIs temporarily closed their doors 
and threatened to withhold the disbursement of hundreds of thousands of dollars in loan 
funds for upcoming harvests, and even to cease entirely their operations in the rural north 
(Navas 2009). 
In October 2008, leaders of the MPCN presented a draft of their demands to local 
Sandinista deputies in the National Assembly with the intention of creating special 
legislation in their favor (Padilla, personal interview with the author, July 5, 2009). Their 
proposal included the reduction of the interest rates charged by MFIs to 12 percent 
annually, the implementation of a six-month grace period, and the cancellation of all 
default interest charges and fees. They also asked that repayment plans for borrowers 
with less than US$10,000 in debt be extended by four years and by five years for those 
with more than US$10,000. In addition, the proposal required MFIs to stop all judicial 
actions—detentions, salary embargos, and seizure and sale of property—against the 
borrowers. Sandinista deputies argued that the special law would only apply to the list of 
borrowers who had fallen into default and made their demands before June 30, 2009; the 
law was a unique case and would not extend to other or future borrowers. MPCN leaders 
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insisted that they would not make any payments on their debts with the MFIs until the 
Assembly approved the law.  
Over the next months, the MPCN continued to pressure MFIs to renegotiate. They 
also began to pressure the national government to intervene in the renegotiation. By 
January, the MPCN claimed over 10,000 borrowers had joined their movement (Padilla, 
personal interview with the author, July 5, 2009). In the evening on January 12, 2009, 
thousands of borrowers took to the Pan-American Highway miles north of Managua and 
formed an eight-hour long road blockade to pressure the government to take measures to 
ensure the renegotiation of debts with the MFIs (Álvarez Hidalgo and Canales Ewest 
2009). The blockade, formed of armed protestors and burning tires, backed up traffic for 
miles. Around 200 anti-riot troops armed with tear gas were dispatched to clear the 
blockade, but once the protesters were dispersed, other protestors were waiting to form 
another roadblock several miles away. As troops cleared the second roadblock in the 
early hours of the morning, the demonstrators moved and planted themselves in front of 
the National Assembly to demand state assistance in their struggle. 
 
THE STATE REACTS TO THE MPCN 
After President Ortega’s public comment in July 2008, the administration 
remained silent in respect to the protests. In early 2009, reports swirled that Ortega still 
maintained his support of the protestors, but insisted that they still continue to repay. In 
July 2009, MPCN protestors packed the glass-separated viewing room of the Nicaraguan 
National Assembly and waited anxiously for the results of a vote to move the Ley de 
Moratoria (Moratorium Law) to the Economic Commission for review and revision. 
Outside, hundreds more demonstrators lined the streets awaiting the vote. The vote on the 
 72 
draft of the Ley de Moratoria (formally La Ley Especial para el Establecimiento de 
Condiciones Básicas y de Garantía para la Renegociación de Adeudos entre las 
Instituciones Microfinancieras y Deudores en Mora [The Special Law for the 
Establishment of Basic Conditions and Guarantee for the Renegotiation of Debts between 
Microfinance Institutions and Debtors in Default]) represented the culmination of 
frustrated negotiations and over a year of public protest and debate between debtors and 
microfinance institutions (Ley 716, 2010). As the vote opened, deputies one by one rose 
to stand in show of support for the protestors. To an uproar of applause, the Assembly 
passed the motion to forward the law to the Commission. In April 2010, the Economic 
Commission returned their revision of the law to the National Assembly, but with one 
significant change: the borrowers would be able to renegotiate their microloans at annual 
interest rates no greater than 16—not 12—percent (Nuñez 2010).  
 
THE REACTION OF THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
The protests and demands of the MPCN and the passage of the Ley de Moratoria 
considerably unsettled the microfinance industry in Nicaragua. At the close of 2009, 
repayment rates had fallen, and the number of clients in default climbed. The sector’s 
lending portfolio shrank 15 percent (Nuñez 2009). The overall number of microfinance 
clients fell from over 350,000 the year before to 292,000 (Álvarez Hidalgo 2010). The 
response of the microfinance institutions, often expressed through ASOMIF, has been to 
reject changes in its practices; to attack the protestors’ moral character and motives; and 
to restate the importance of the industry for clients, institutions, and the national 
economy.  
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The microfinance sector adamantly rejected renegotiation of the terms of their 
microcredit loans. The institutions had to charge market rates and recuperate loans in a 
timely fashion in order to cover the costs of its operations, or it would be forced to close 
and leave thousands of clients without access to microcredit. The manager of one MFI 
argued that since the rates of default were so low, there was no problem with the interest 
rates they charged:  
 
The basic problem with our loans is not the interest rate. The test for this is 
that of 559,000 clients that we have on a national level, less than one 
percent of are in the courts. This so-called movement has fifteen hundred 
people. The conclusion is easy. If the problem were the interest rates, the 
majority would be in a situation of default, and it is not like that (personal 
interview with the author, July 20, 2009).  
 
The quantifiable success of microfinance in terms of repayment rates was offered as 
proof that the terms are not usurious and clients were in general able to repay.  
In efforts to discredit the MPCN, ASOMIF attacked the protesters as a small 
group of borrowers who were just looking for a way out of paying on their obligations. 
The borrowers only encouraged anyone else with debt simply not to pay: “They would 
say, Hey, if I, who has always paid well my debt, now I see that there is an organized 
movement, I will say, If they don’t pay, why should I have to pay?” (personal interview 
with the author, July 20, 2009).  Critics began referring to the protests as El Movimiento 
No Pago (the I Don’t Pay Movement), a name that would stick and repeatedly come up in 
news headlines on the protests. In the public debate, critics called those who did not pay 
on their loans lazy, thieves, losers, and charged them with ruining credit opportunities for 
“good” clients who borrow responsibly and repay on schedule. ASOMIF warned that the 
borrowers participating in the protests and failing to pay on their debts were named in a 
database amongst the various MFIs and would not be eligible for credit in the future. The 
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MFIs also attacked the MPCN for fomenting a greater national problem: a “culture of 
non-payment” (Editorial, La Prensa 2010). To combat the ideas spread by the protests, 
ASOMIF launched a campaign to meet with clients of MFIs and urge borrowers not to 
unite with the “No Pago” (Canales Ewest 2009a).  
ASOMIF attacked the protests as a politically motivated (Sandinista) effort to 
undermine the private microfinance sector. In early 2009, La Prensa released a story 
about an alleged letter sent from one regional leader of the MCPN to a political 
representative within El Consejo del Poder Ciudadano (CPC) (Canales Ewest 2009b). In 
the letter, the MPCN leader supposedly remarks that the movement’s goal was to combat 
the country’s entire financial system and instead have the state-sponsored microcredit 
program, ALBA-Caruna, control all credit resources. The leader denies having written 
the letter. However, ASOMIF used the report to tie the MPCN to the Sandinista party.  
ASOMIF spokespersons defended the industry and maintained the importance of 
its role in the rural economy in the provision of credit resources—some US$200 million 
of credit annually—to hundreds of thousands of clients who would otherwise not have 
access to borrowed capital. ASOMIF repeatedly warned that the instability caused by the 
MPCN was putting at risk millions of dollars of credit for thousands of small-scale 
producers and small businesses and could potentially paralyze the country’s production 
and business sectors. In the weeks following the violent protest at Fundenuse in July 
2008, MFI branches in northern Nicaragua did close their doors and temporarily cease 
operations. As repayment rates fell and the numbers of clients dropped, some branches 
closed permanently in more rural areas, particularly those with greater participation in the 
protests. La Prensa predicted that the closure of these institutions would lead to “total 
chaos” (Lorío and Cerda 2008). 
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After passage of the Ley de Moratoria, the microfinance sector urged President 
Ortega to veto the law. Twenty-five international funding agencies (from Switzerland, the 
United States, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Costa 
Rica) published an announcement in the press to express their preoccupation with the 
deterioration of a favorable climate for investment caused by the actions of the protestors 
(Roodman 2009). Representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced 
that they would analyze the law and its potential impact on the national economy 
(Aguilera and Nuñez 2010). They suggested that the approval of the law might affect the 
present revisions of the IMF macroeconomic program for Nicaragua and reminded 
officials that the Nicaraguan government had signed a letter of intention in October 2009 
to guarantee the stability of the national financial system. Aguerri, president of the 
Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (Cosep), admitted that the IMF had made clear 
its complete opposition to state intervention in the free market. Robert Callahan, the 
Ambassador of the United States in Nicaragua, and Silvio Conrado, representative of the 
BCIE, one of the most important microfinance funders in the region, expressed concerns 
that the law would create economic uncertainty and instability and negatively affect the 
financial climate for future investment interests (Navas and Álvarez 2010). 
 
THE MPCN AFTER THE LEY DE MORATORIA 
Borrowers were split after the law was passed. Some celebrated the legal 
framework that gave them the right to renegotiate their debts under new and more 
favorable terms. Others, however, rejected the Commission’s proposal to increase interest 
rates and continued to push for further state intervention. The Ley de Moratoria 
established a period of 120 days for borrowers eligible for restructured loans to approach 
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the MFIs for negotiations. As the deadline passed, just a few hundred of the reported 
thousands of borrowers had restructured their loans. The MFIs attacked the MPCN and 
cited the lack of response to the arranged negotiations as further proof that the 
participants simply did not want to pay back their loans.  
Borrowers under one regional leader reemerged in the summer of 2010 with new 
demands. Unable to negotiate directly with the MFIs for what they considered reasonable 
terms of repayment, the group turned to the Nicaraguan government and requested that 
the state purchase the outstanding loans from the MFIs and reestablish them in terms 
comparable to the semi-state controlled microlending program, ALBA-Caruna (Navas 
2010a). At the end of 2010, the Ortega government had not publicly shown willingness to 
meet these demands, and economists have raised doubts about the state’s capacity to 
purchase the loans. Thousands of borrowers in protest continue with sporadic 
demonstrations, now planted at the doors of government offices, demanding further state 
intervention.  
Meanwhile, the National Assembly has revived debate on a specialized law for 
the regulation of microfinance in Nicaragua. The Ley de Microfinanzas (Microfinance 
Law) would establish the regulation of MFIs under the Superintendency. The law, first 
introduced to the Assembly in 2004, had stalled in debates. In discussions with Assembly 
deputies, ASOMIF representatives have petitioned for the inclusion of the legal 
authorization to capture savings deposits from clients, receive and pay remittances, and 
manage insurance and payment services—functions reserved to formal commercialized 
financial institutions. ASOMIF has also urged for the law to override the Ley de 
Préstamos entre Particulares (Loans between Entities Law) and to codify MFIs’ use of 
“free” market-based interest rates (Navas 2010b). Under pressure from the IMF in late 
2009, the Nicaraguan government agreed to take steps to foster greater regulation and 
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transparency in the country’s microfinance sector. However, the Assembly has refused to 
allow these measures with concerns of how the state would regulate the sector. Freddy 
Torres, vice-president of the Economic Commission, reported an internal debate around 
the implementation of interest rate caps at a maximum rate of 60 percent (Alvarez 
Hidalgo 2010). As 2010 came to a close, the state of the microfinance sector in Nicaragua 
was still unsettled. 
The MPCN emerged when desperate borrowers faced difficulties repaying their 
debts. Having defaulted on their loan repayment, mounting fees and interests only 
compounded the borrowers’ debt and dampened their prospects for repayment. Local 
microfinance institutions refused to alter the terms of the loans and proceeded with their 
collection processes. In extreme cases, borrowers in default were evicted from their 
homes or thrown in jail. Frustrated by the strict loan conditions and the severity of the 
consequences of default, the borrowers organized to demand that the MFIs renegotiate in 
fair terms for struggling borrowers. When MFIs rejected the notion of negotiation, the 
MPCN turned to the state to create special, client-centered and client-protective 
legislation. In the next and final chapter, I analyze the case of the MPCN and consider 
how the experiences and demands of the borrowers reflect the critique of microfinance as 
a hegemonic discourse that supports neoliberalism. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Discussion 
 
No one should be surprised at the reaction against the microfinance institutions. 
The protests are a reaction against the economic abandonment in which we 
Nicaraguans have lived for nearly 20 years. Look, microcredit is not a solution for 
the poor. If it were, poverty might have diminished in the past two decades in 
Nicaragua. But look around. It has not. Instead, we’re worse off than we were 
before. 
 Carlos (personal interview with author, July 7, 2009) 
 
The MPCN protests represent microcredit borrowers’ dissatisfaction and 
frustration with the practice and nature of microfinance in Nicaragua. Their struggle for 
fair loan terms and client protections is a struggle for reprieve from the burdens of 
microfinance debt in their daily lives. Their demands and critiques strike at the heart of 
the microfinance discourse and the hegemonic ideologies on which it relies. The protests 
mark a significant moment for Nicaragua’s microfinance industry and the mainstream 
market-led approach to development. 
The borrowers who join the MPCN are not all, or not even a majority, of the total 
number of microcredit clients in Nicaragua, but their political impact has been 
significant. Without a large, random survey of the protestors, it is difficult to gauge 
accurately the breakdown of participants in terms of their economic status, gender, 
political affiliation, geographical region of residence, type of business activity, or type of 
loans accessed. The MPCN itself is not entirely cohesive, with different regional leaders 
and individuals within the groups with different circumstances that brought them to 
participate. By witnessing and tracking images and video of public demonstrations, 
tracking representations in national press, and speaking to participants, I have tried to 
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develop a sense of who these borrowers are, what brought them to the protest, and what 
they demand as a result. I suggest that the MPCN both reflects an overall snapshot of 
microfinance lending trends and clientele in Nicaragua.  
To begin, the MPCN appears to have a majority of male participants. This more 
or less reflects the uneven division of credit resources among male and female borrowers: 
while more than half of Nicaragua’s microcredit clients are female, more than half of 
microcredit monies are lent to men (more women receive small loans and fewer men 
receive larger-sized loans). Moreover, MPCN participants overwhelmingly are not the 
poorest of the poor—and some are arguably not even poor—but most of them are 
economically vulnerable. They are landowners, small to medium-scale farmers, small 
business owners, and salaried workers. Many of them obtained their microcredit loans by 
virtue of their access to some sort of physical collateral, especially land. As Nicaragua’s 
microfinance sector has increasingly pursued market-based models, MFIs have directed 
loan monies to individual borrowers instead of solidarity groups, and increasingly 
required physical collateral and relied on strong loan recovery mechanisms.  
The stories of these borrowers present us with new narratives about microfinance. 
In these narratives, many microcredit borrowers do not experience positive or 
empowering impacts as a result of their participation in microcredit. Rather, they face 
spiraling debts, loss of their means to income, homelessness, and greater poverty. As 
Maria commented, the experience can be compared to that of cancer eating away at her, 
eventually leading to a form of death. The borrower is not uplifted through his or her 
relationship with microfinance; rather she suffers as a result of unfair and unequal 
relationships with the usurious institutions. Such narratives starkly conflict with the 
countless “success stories” dominating the microfinance discourse. 
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Through their stories, the borrowers in many ways reproduce the ideal client 
subjectivities constructed within the microfinance discourse. Borrowers insist that they 
are responsible borrowers. They invested their loans in their income-generating activities, 
and they worked hard. The MCPN demonstrators, however, also discuss their 
vulnerability as poor clients. Regardless of smart investments and hard work, they are 
poor or economically vulnerable. While the microfinance discourse might acknowledge 
that their clients are poor, their poverty is second to their industrious, responsible, and 
creative character that will lead to their ultimate success. The protestors, however, refer 
to their vulnerability to underscore their susceptibility to market fluctuations, personal 
emergencies, and natural disasters that affect their lives and their chances for repayment. 
The market is precarious and not their route to their exit from poverty. 
The borrowers make specific demands for better loan terms—lower interest rates, 
more flexible and longer-term repayment schedules, and stronger protections during 
difficult times. Interestingly, what they describe are clearly not microfinance loans. The 
type of loans they need and want are not loans with terms determined by market-based 
rates and assumed unmet demand, but rather client-centered loans that take into account 
the nature of their needs. Ultimately, the borrowers are rejecting the notion of “self-help” 
through markets as the guide for development in private spheres. Rather, they insist on 
state intervention for, at the very least, client protections and institutional oversight. 
Borrowers without other potentially effective recourse, turn to the state to outline and 
enforce regulation of an industry that has relied on market freedoms to determine interest 
rates.  
Moreover, the borrower protests position the economic, social, and psychological 
well-being of microcredit clients as an important marker of microfinance success. This 
challenges the sector’s reliance on indicators such as repayment rates, efficiency, 
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outreach and financial sustainability to judge its success and justify its value to society 
and the economy.  
The position taken by Nicaragua’s microfinance sector reconstructs the logic of a 
market-based approach to development. Microfinance leaders argue that the purportedly 
high levels of unmet demand for credit and the high borrower repayment rates surely 
indicate that clients want these loans, are willing to accept the terms, and are 
overwhelmingly capable of repaying. Furthermore, the microfinance sector argues that it 
must charge market rates, reflecting the high cost and risk involved in lending to their 
target clients, in order to sustain its lending program and increase its outreach. Through 
strong, stable institutions, the microfinance sector can bring more credit opportunities to 
more borrowers. The microfinance sector adamantly rejects state involvement in the 
market-based nature of their practice. ASOMIF opposes any legal restrictions on interest 
rates and collection recovery as threats to the potential sustainability of institutions.  
By attacking the MPCN borrowers, the microfinance industry reinforces the 
ideologies underlying the microfinance model and its ideal client construction. The sector 
claims that these protestors are not the hard-working, rational entrepreneurs exemplified 
in the microfinance discourse. As the microfinance sector frames it, they are shameless 
thieves who did not work hard enough or use the money the right way, and regardless, 
they did not responsibly pay back their loans. Their actions put at risk the promise of 
national economic development as well as availability of credit resources for hundreds of 
thousands of responsible borrowers.  
The state, through various actors, has communicated varying levels of support for 
both the MPCN and the microfinance industry. Since microfinance emerged in Nicaragua 
in the 1990s, the state has generally encouraged and facilitated private, unregulated 
microfinance and has played an active role in channeling resources. However, at various 
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points, the state has reigned in the microfinance sector, particularly in the establishment 
of interest rates, and created legal measures in efforts to protect against potential abuses. 
In this case, the state responded to the some of the demands of the MPCN and passed 
special legislation in their favor. The passage of legislation marks a real change for the 
relationship between microfinance and the state, one in which the state insists on a 
position of more control over the sector’s activities in relation to its clients.  
However, the state has yet to define a clear position on microfinance. Ortega’s 
current administration has increasingly involved itself in the direct provision of low-
interest, small loans to the poor groups via ALBA-Caruna. While Caruna has grown to 
play a significant part in the microcredit sector, its lower rates and more favorable terms 
for poorer borrowers have not significantly encouraged other MFIs to lower interest rates.  
While some protestors now encourage Ortega’s administration to play a new role 
as direct provider of microcredit for poor Nicaraguans, the state’s capacity or willingness 
to do so is unclear. Moreover, the state has treaded lightly to not upset the microfinance 
sector and external funding agencies and, in accordance with recent IMF agreements, the 
National Assembly has revived discussions on the creation of a regulatory environment 
for microfinance. 
As Bateman (2010) argues, microfinance and its focus on individual self-help and 
personal responsibility for daily survival thwarts the opportunity for the poor to pursue 
more transformational politics, such as labor organizing, social movements, and 
pressuring governments for more pro-poor policies. In Nicaragua, however, borrowers 
have joined together in collective protest to challenge the current microfinance trends and 
make their claims on the state. Understanding the perspectives of borrowers—and 
development beneficiaries in general—is useful because it complicates the larger 
development discourse (Shakya and Rankin 2008). In this case, the borrowers’ resistance 
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and demands have significant implications for microfinance and market-led development 
in Nicaragua and worldwide. Their protests reveal the limitations of microcredit as a tool 
for poverty alleviation and economic development. For these borrowers, microfinance 
does not empower them to lift themselves out of poverty as the hype had promised. 
Microfinance, and in particular commercialized microcredit, is not a cure-all for poverty. 
As borrowers react to these realities, microfinance practitioners, states, and the 
international development community will be forced to respond to resistances and 
challenges to the hegemonic microfinance paradigm.  
In light of the limitations of microfinance, I suggest a reimagining of the current 
microfinance models and the market-led approach to development and replacing it with a 
client-centered, rights-based approach to economic development. I argue that states might 
create more responsive models of development based on the basic rights and protections 
for the poor. As Shakya and Rankin argue, this “involves a more fundamental rethinking 
about the relations between states and the market, since it begs the question of financial 
sustainability” (2008:1232). States might be forced to rethink the role of state-led 
development programs and subsidies in order to meet the needs and conditions of the 
poor. Moreover, states might consider investing in human and physical capital—
infrastructure, health, education, technology, and industry—to support and protect the 
poor and encourage stable local markets. Simply, we might reimagine a very different 
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